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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes a sentence is worth a thousand words. In 1964, as
the Supreme Court stumbled toward a constitutional approach to
obscenity, Justice Potter Stewart suggested that only "hard-core
pornography" should be suppressed.' He admitted that the
category may be incapable of "intelligibl[e]" definition, but
nonetheless confidently asserted, "I know it when I see it."
2
Justice Stewart's sentence captures the essence of the Court's
sexual expression jurisprudence, which rests more on the assertion
of distinctions than on reasoned analysis. For many years, the
Court, unable to agree upon a doctrinal framework for obscenity
regulation, simply ruled by per curiam judgments, without offering
any explanation for what it was doing.' When the Court did
attempt to explain its actions, some suggested that it would have
been better off maintaining its silence.'
The Court has now put forward a set of doctrinal "rules" that in
the end do little more than obscure what is basically Stewart's
intuitive approach. In defining obscenity, the Court has advanced
an incoherent formula that requires the application of "community
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s See e.g., Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-71 (1967) (per curiam); see also
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
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standards" without any specification of what constitutes a "commu-
nity";5 the identification of national "reasonable" judgments about
artistic and literary taste, a subject on which reason may be of little
guidance and on which the nation is likely to have no consensus;
6
the differentiation of healthy from "shameful or morbid" sexual
interests;7 and the determination that speech is "patently offen-
sive,"8 ajudgment which in nonsexual circumstances is a reason for
protecting, not criminalizing speech.'
Even where speech is not legally obscene, the Court permits the
government to regulate "offensive" sexual speech in ways that it
could not regulate "offensive" political speech."0 The "offensive
5 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974) (holding that it is constitutionally
permissible to instruct "jurors to apply 'community standards' without specifying
which 'community'").
6 In Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987), the Court held that in judging
whether a work has "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," the Court
must apply a national "reasonable person" standard. Justice Scalia, concurring, noted
the impossibility of this determination:
[I1n my view it is quite impossible to come to an objective assessment of (at
least) literary or artistic value, there being many accomplished people who
have found literature in Dada, and art in the replication of a soup can.
Since ratiocination has little to do with esthetics, the fabled "reasonable
man" is of little help in the inquiry, and would have to be replaced with,
perhaps, the "man of tolerably good taste'-a description that betrays the
lack of an ascertainable standard. If evenhanded and accurate decision-
making is not always impossible under such a regime, it is at least impossi-
ble in the cases that matter. I think we would be better advised to adopt as
a legal maxim what has long been the wisdom of mankind: De gustibus non
est disputandum. Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is no use
litigating about it.
Id. at 504-05 (Scalia, J., concurring).
As Graham Hughes has written: "The disgust of the ordinary man is a dangerous
guide for legislation, butjudicial reliance upon notions of what disgusts the ordinary
man is even more dangerous." Graham Hughes, Morals and the Criminal Law, 71
YALE L.J. 662, 677 (1962). For an amusing attempt to capture the nation's artistic
taste, see Alexander Melamid et al., Painting by Numbers: The Search for a People's Art,
258 NATION 334 (1994).
' Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1985) (holding that
obscene matter must appeal to "shameful or morbid" sexual desires, not to a "normal
interest in sex").
' Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating that state obscenity statutes
must "be limited to works ... which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way").
' See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagree-
able.").10 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); FCC v. Pacifica
PLAYING BY PORNOGRAPHY'S RULES
speech" doctrine has developed, moreover, without any attempt to
define what constitutes "offensive speech." If the "obscenity"
doctrine rests on a definition that is internally incoherent, the
"offensive speech" doctrine rests on no definition at all.
The claim that speech can be suppressed because "I know it
when I see it," even if what the Court sees and knows cannot be
intelligibly articulated, implies a peculiar relationship between the
Court, the law, the community, and sexual speech. Ordinarily,
attempts to regulate speech because of its content are subjected to
exacting judicial scrutiny and require a compelling justification.
When it comes to sexual expression, however, the state is not
obliged to offer a compelling rationale, and the Court's decisions
proceed by assertion rather than by logical reasoning. Like Justice
Stewart's claim, the Court's doctrine suggests that sexual expression
can (and perhaps must) be regulated by law even if (and precisely
because) it is beyond reasoned discussion.
The peculiar relationship between law and sexual expression is
perhaps best exemplified by the Indiana statute upheld in Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc.," which required otherwise nude dancers to wear
pasties and G-strings. At first glance, the law, upheld as a legitimate
effort to shore up community morals, appears to serve little, if any,
moral purpose; an exceedingly fine line distinguishes the wholly
nude dancer from one attired in accordance with Indiana law.
Indeed, for many, the scant covering required would likely make the
dancers more sexy, not less.'" Indiana's insistence that this line be
maintained-and the Court's approval of that line-suggests that
what is ultimately at stake is not the prohibition of sex itself, but the
assertion of the right (and capacity) to control its public representa-
tion.
Barnes reflects one of the most curious features of the regulation
of sexual expression: at least as a matter of doctrine, public
representations of sex are more subject to regulation than sexual
behavior. This reverses the usual relationship between conduct and
expression. While it is illegal, for example, to rob a bank, it is not
illegal to publish a novel or make a movie about robbing a bank.
Scholars and jurists have long debated over the precise point at
which advocacy of illegal conduct should lose its First Amendment
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976).
11501 U.S. 560 (1991).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 219-29.
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protection, but no one denies that a novelist, filmmaker or
playwright has the right to depict illegal acts. Central to the First
Amendment tradition is the notion that one has broader freedom
in one's expression than in one's acts.
When it comes to sex, however, the rule is reversed. While
sexual conduct is far from unregulated,is constitutional law
permits more extensive regulation of the public representation of
sexual behavior than of the behavior itself. As construed by the
Supreme Court, the First Amendment not only fails to protect
representations of illegal sexual conduct; it permits the state to
criminalize the representation of sexual conduct that is itself legal
to engage in. Obscenity doctrine, for example, permits the
proscription of prurient depictions of "patently offensive" sexual
conduct, whether or not the underlying conduct is (or could be)
unlawful. Similarly, while private nude dancing has never been
banned, its public display may be extensively regulated. 4
This Article seeks to address the questions raised by Justice
Stewart's sentence, Barnes's image, and our culture's obsession with
regulating the public representation of sex. Part I argues that the
conventional justifications for permitting the regulation of sexual
expression-that sexual expression is not political, and is more akin
to conduct than speech-are inadequate because they rest on overly
simplistic notions of both sexuality and speech, and are contrary to
core First Amendment principles.
In Part II, I suggest that the answer to why representations of
sexual conduct are more subject to regulation than sex itself lies in
the demarcation between public and private spheres. Laws
15 In particular, virtually all states prohibit prostitution and incest, while, as of
1994, only eighteen states have criminalized sodomy. Search of LEXIS, Codes
Library, Allcde File (Sept. 21, 1994) (finding antisodomy statutes in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, and Utah). Prostitution, however, is generally tolerated despite the laws on
the books, and sodomy is rarely prosecuted. I do not mean to understate the
significance of laws regulating sexual behavior. Particularly with respect to
prohibitions on homosexual sex, such laws are often "enforced" by less direct means
than a criminal prosecution. Thus, government employers may fire gay employees,
courts may deny gay and lesbian parents custody of their children, and private parties
may "enforce" such prohibitions through gay-bashing and the like.
14 Similarly, in Great Britain, "moral regulation in the 1970s took the form of the
regulation of representations of sexuality as opposed to regulation of sexual behaviour."
Lynda Nead, The Female Nude: Pornography, Art, and Sexuality, in SEX EXPOSED:
SEXUALITY AND THE PoRNocRAPHY DEBATE 280, 285 (Lynne Segal & Mary McIntosh
eds., 1993) [hereinafter SEX EXPOSED].
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PLAYING BY PORNOGRAPHY'S RULES
regarding sexual expression focus primarily on keeping sex out of
the public sphere. Society targets for repression those who
challenge the public/private line by making public sexual matters
that the majority would prefer remained private. In fact, for some
the essence of the obscene is its "publication" of private sexuality.
The Court's sexual speech doctrine adopts and reinforces this
public/private line. Obscenity in the home, for example, is
constitutionally protected,15 while the sale or transportation of the
same obscenity may be criminalized. 6
Through a close reading of Barnes, Part II then suggests that the
Court's obsession with preserving the public/private line in sexual
speech is not only contrary to, but has actually inverted two of the
most basic principles of First Amendmentjurisprudence. Ordinari-
ly, the selective regulation of public conduct triggers heightened
First Amendment scrutiny because it indicates an attempt to stifle
communication; here, regulation of public conduct is permitted
precisely because the conduct is public. And ordinarily the fact that
the majority finds particular speech offensive is a reason to protect
it; when it comes to sexual expression, however, community offense
is the justification for suppression. I point to these inversions not
so much to offer a doctrinal First Amendment defense of sexual
speech-although I think a strong defense can be made-as to
suggest that something else is going on. Analysis of the regulation
of sexual expression must extend beyond doctrine to a cultural
examination of the regulatory imperative.
Part III therefore asks why society places such emphasis on
drawing public/private lines in matters of sexual expression. In
part, no doubt, enforcement of these lines provides the illusion that
we can control sexuality, a matter always in doubt. But where prior
accounts have stressed the effects that sexual repression and
15 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment
bans criminalization of obscenity in the home).
6 
6 See United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973)
(holding that importation of obscene materials for private use may be prohibited);
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (holding that mailing of obscene
materials for private use may be criminalized).
Mere possession of child pornography may be constitutionally criminalized. See
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
However, the rationale for prohibiting child pornography-the protection of children
from necessarily nonconsensual sexual exploitation-distinguishes the regulation of
child pornography from the regulation of other pornography. This Article does not
address the issue of child pornography, but only addresses sexual expression made
by, for, and with consenting adults.
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regulation have on the maintenance of social order, power, and
productivity, I suggest that we consider the effects that such
regulation has on sexuality itself.
Sexual expression, I propose, inevitably confounds society's
attempts to regulate it. It subverts every taboo by making it a fetish.
The forbidden is simultaneously eroticized. As a result, attempts to
regulate sexual expression are doomed to failure; by creating taboos
to transgress, regulation only adds to sexual expression's appeal. At
the same time, by obsessively seeking to regulate and control sexual
expression, we construct a sexuality that is in turn obsessed with
transgression and taboo, often to the exclusion of other values. Our
regulations endlessly reproduce a pornographic conception of
sexuality, which in turn limits our ability to remake sexuality in a
different light. Thus, those who are critical of the pornographic
character of American sexuality-whether from an aesthetic, -moral,
or feminist perspective-may only reinforce that character if they
continue to insist on a strategy of suppression.
I. REGULATING SEXUAL EXPRESSION:
THE TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Two principal justifications have been advanced to explain why
government should have a freer hand in regulating sexual expres-
sion than in regulating most other forms of expression. The first
asserts that sexual speech is categorically different from political
speech, and therefore of low value. The second claims that sexual
expression is closer to conduct than speech, either because it fails
to appeal to the intellect or because it subordinates women, and
therefore does not deserve the full protection accorded other modes
of expression. Neither justification is sufficient to explain the
reduced constitutional status of sexual speech.
A. Sex and Politics
The central focus of the First Amendment tradition has been
political speech. First Amendment lore begins with the criminali-
zation of criticism of the government in the Sedition Act of 1798,
which President Jefferson soundly repudiated by pardoning all
convicted under it.17 The first important speech cases decided by
"T In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77 (1964), the Supreme
Court relied upon the repudiation of the Sedition Act to justify imposing strict First
Amendment restrictions on actions for libel of public officials.
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the Supreme Court involved antiwar protestors during World War
.18 Beginning between the World Wars and continuing well into
the 1960s, most of the Court's leading First Amendment cases
reviewed attempts to penalize Communist or Socialist Party
members and fellow travelers for their speech or associations. 9
The civil rights movement gave rise to another set of constitutional
battles over political speech, as the First Amendment was invoked
to guarantee the right to engage in sit-ins,20 to protect the news
media's reporting on Southern officials' mistreatment of black citi-
zens, 21 and to enjoin state courts from using criminal laws to
harass civil rights activists.22
" See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction under
the Espionage Act of 1917 for circulating leaflets urging opposition to conscription);
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding Espionage Act conviction of
Socialist Party national leader for speech in which he praised persons convicted of
aiding others to avoid induction into the armed services); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding conviction for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act
by publishing articles in German language newspaper critical of war effort); Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding Espionage Act convictions of Russian
immigrants who distributed leaflets calling for general strike to oppose war). The
Supreme Court did decide speech cases prior to 1919, see generally David M. Rabban,
The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981), but the World War
I cases are seen as sowing the seeds of the speech-protective doctrine we know today.
See David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition,
95 YALE L.J. 857, 879-92 (1986).
9 See e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (upholding conviction under
criminal anarchy statute of Socialist Party member for publishing "The Left Wing
Manifesto," which advocated revolutionary socialism); Whitneyv. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927) (upholding conviction under California Criminal Syndicalism Act for
membership in Communist Labor Party); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927)
(overturning conviction under Kansas Criminal Syndicalism Act for soliciting
members for Workers' Industrial Union); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(overturning conviction under Criminal Syndicalism Law of Oregon for conducting
a meeting of the Communist Party); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)
(overturning conviction under Georgia statute for inciting insurrection by recruiting
members for the Communist Party); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)
(upholding Smith Act convictions of national Communist Party leaders); Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (overturning Smith Act convictions of Communist
Party members); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (upholding Smith Act
conviction of Communist Party member merely for active membership in organization
advocating illegal overthrow of government); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967) (affirming dismissal of an indictment brought under Subversive Activities
Control Act of a Communist Party member for engaging in employment at defense
facility). See generally Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping
of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1991).
2 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
21 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
' See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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The Court's record in these political speech cases is on the
whole not very inspiring. The Court's earliest First Amendment
cases affirmed heavy prison sentences for pure political speech
unrelated to any unlawful conduct.2" As late as 1951 the Court
upheld convictions for mere membership in the Communist
Party.24 And it was not until 1964 that the Supreme Court extend-
ed First Amendment protection to criticism of public officials.
25
By the late 1960s, however, the Court adopted fairly strong
speech-protective doctrines for political speech. In Brandenburg v.
Ohio,"6 the Court held that speech advocating unlawful conduct
cannot be proscribed unless it is intended and likely to produce
such conduct imminently--a test which the government can rarely
meet. With New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 and its progeny, the
Court protected criticism of public officials and public figures, so
long as the statements are not made with knowledge that they are
false or with reckless indifference to the truth. And in Texas v.
Johnson,28 the Court, overturning a conviction for burning the
American flag, held that the government cannot prohibit symbolic
political expression simply because it offends the majority of the
public. Taken together, these cases offer significant safeguards for
political speech.
The political speech cases are generally seen as the core of First
Amendment doctrine. They reflect the principles that government
may not determine truth or propriety in the realm of public
discourse, that a free and vigorous public debate is crucial to the
process of deliberative self-government, that the purpose of the First
Amendment is to protect the rights of dissidents and minority
voices, and that the best check on the abuse of power is the light of
public scrutiny and criticism. It is cases and principles like these
that have led law professors to call for dancing in the streets.
29
But the First Amendment also has another story. This story has
a much shorter time span, ranging from the 1950s to the present.
" See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
24 See United States v. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494 (19M).
25 See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292.
26 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
(extending First Amendment protection to criticisin of "public figures").
28 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
" See Harry Kalven,Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaniing
of the First Amendmen4" 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (describing the reaction
of Alexander Meiklejohn to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan).
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It concerns the regulation of sexual expression, including obscenity,
offensive speech, and public nudity. The Court's doctrine in this
area could not be more different from its political speech jurispru-
dence. In the realm of sexual expression, the fact that a majority of
the community finds speech offensive or immoral is often sufficient
to justify its regulation. As Justice Stevens explained, Voltaire's
remark that "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it""0 does not apply to the subject of sex.
The First Amendment thus has two significant traditions that
coexist in conspicuous tension. To account for that tension, some
members of the Supreme Court have asserted a qualitative differ-
ence between sexual and political speech. In Youngv. American Mini
Theatres, Inc.,"1 for example, Justice Stevens maintained that
content-based regulation of sexual expression is permissible because
"society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate.""2 As he put it, in terms that echoed Justice
Stewart's "I know it when I see it":
Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to
applaud or to despise what is said, every schoolchild can under-
stand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same.
But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities"
exhibited in the theaters of our choice 3
Because it is deemed less valuable, sexual speech has a different
location on "the hierarchy of First Amendment values," and, unlike
political expression, may be suppressed in certain contexts. 4 As
the Court recently said of nude dancing, it is "within the outer
perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only
marginally so."3
s
30 S.C. TAL.LENTYRE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907) (quoted in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976)).
3 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
32 Id. at 70.
33 Id.
'4 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978).
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality); see also id. at
n.3 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "protection of sexually explicit expression
may be of lesser societal importance than the protection of other forms of expres-
sion"); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 n.2 (1986) (noting
that society's interest in protecting sexual speech is of a lesser magnitude than the
interest in protqcting political speech).
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While a majority of the Supreme Court did not expressly adopt
Justice Stevens's view in American Mini Theatres, the Court's First
Amendment doctrine nonetheless appears to depend upon the
claim that sexual expression is not political.3 6 The Court allows
government to regulate sexual expression in ways that it flatly
forbids for political speech. Sexual expression can be zoned to
remote parts of town,"7 denied access to the airwaves until late at
night, 8 and even criminally suppressed if the community finds it
simultaneously appealing, offensive, and valueless.3 9 Most recently,
nude dancers can be required to wear pasties and a G-string to
uphold the community's morals." By contrast, the state is general-
ly barred from regulating political expression, even if an overwhelm-
' In American Mini Theatres, Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court
upholding a zoning ordinance imposed only on adult movie theaters. See 427 U.S. at
52. However, four Justices dissented, see id. at 84 (Stewart, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, jJ., dissenting), and Justice Powell wrote separately to note that he
disagreed with Justice Stevens's view "that nonobscene, erotic materials may be
treated differently under First Amendment principles from other forms of protected
expression." Id. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761
(Powell,J., concurring) (voting to uphold FCC restriction on hours when "indecent"
material could be broadcast, but writing separately to state that "in my view, the result
in this case does not turn on whether Carlin's monologue, viewed as a whole, or the
words that constitute it, have more or less 'value' than a candidate's campaign
speech").
In both American Mini Theatres and Pacffica,Justice Powell, who cast the decisive
votes, insisted that he did not acceptJustice Stevens's view that sexual expression is
less valuable than political expression, and therefore less worthy of First Amendment
protection. See 427 U.S. at 73 n.1; 438 U.S. at 761. At the same time, however,
Powell voted to uphold the regulations at issue in both cases. Justice Brennan
concluded that if Powell meant what he said-that there should be no distinction
between political and sexual expression-his analysis would permit government to
regulate political speech in the same manner that it has regulated sexual speech. See
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 772 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under Pacifica the FCC could
ban "offensive" political expression from the airwaves while children might be
listening. And under American Mini Theatres a town council could zone dissident
political bookstores or speakers to particular areas of town if it concluded that they
attracted an undesirable clientele that caused "secondary" problems. Since it is
extremely unlikely that Powell would have upheld such regulations of politically
offensive speech, he must have been relying, despite his demurrers, on an unspoken
distinction between political and sexual speech.
37 See City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 43; American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 72-73.
's Seg Pacfica, 438 U.S. at 750.
" See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Under the Miller standard, a
jury must find speech to both appeal to the prurient interests and be patently
offensive in order to find it obscene. In addition, the jury must find that the work
lacks any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
' See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563 (1991).
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ing majority of the public finds it offensive, immoral, and without
redeeming value.
4 1
Perhaps the most extreme version of such a hierarchy of
political and sexual speech was proposed by the Solicitor General in
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The Court did not accept this absurdly specific categorization, which
would have required explaining, among other things, why gossip is
less valuable than humor but more valuable than comic books. But
the Court's obscenity doctrine nonetheless rests on a categorical
assertion that at least some sexually explicit speech is different from
and less valuable than political speech. Justice Brennan's decision
in Roth held that the First Amendment was designed to assure an
unfettered exchange of ideas "having even the slightest redeeming
social importance," but found that "implicit in the history of the
4 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (asserting that "if there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that Government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable"); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,50 (1988) (extending First
Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and intended to inflict
emotional injury); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21 (1971) (protecting, under the
First Amendment, the right to wear ajacket bearing the message, "Fuck the Draft").
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
43 Brief for the United States at 29, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(No. 582).
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First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance." 44  Under current obscenity doc-
trine, once sexual speech is found to have no "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value," it may be criminally prohibited
if the community finds it shamefully or morbidly prurient and
patently offensive.45
Thus, the Court's strategy for resolving the tension between
sexual and political speech is to assert an objective difference in the
character of the speech. 46 That categorical assertion is expressly
built into the obscenity doctrine-political speech is by definition
not obscene-and implied in the "offensive speech" doctrine
(because one cannot imagine the Court permitting zoning of
politically offensive bookstores). But the assertion is neither
descriptively accurate nor normatively justified.
As a descriptive matter, the political significance of sexual
expression is revealed every day. Sexuality and its expression have
become heated political issues in virtually every arena, from local
school board disputes over sex education, 47 to state anti-gay
legislative efforts,4" to conservative and feminist attempts to
Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
4' Some commentators have embraced this justification. Cass Sunstein, for
example, argues that pornography maybe regulated consistentwith the FirstAmend-
ment because it is "low value" speech, in part because its subject is far afield from
political speech. See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986
DUKE LJ. 589, 602-05.
47 See, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap, Sexual Speech and the State: Putting Pornography in Its
Place, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 359, 369-70 (1987) (describing the Californian
debate over sex education guidelines in 1986 and 1987).
48 On November 3, 1992, Colorado voters passed Amendment 2, which prohibits
the enactment of ordinances against discrimination on sexual orientation grounds and
repealed gay rights ordinances in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver. See Legislator Offering
Measure to Repeal Anti-Gay Vote, Reuters Limited, December 7, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUNA File.
In Oregon, the Oregon Citizens' Alliance (OCA) promoted Ballot Measure 9, a
1992 initiative that would have removed homosexual materials from schools and
decreed homosexuality to be "wrong, abnormal, unnatural and perverse." Melinda
Bargreen, A Big Round ofJeers for These "Honorees, " SEATLE TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, at
Fl. Although the referendum did not pass, 16 Oregon cities and counties have
adopted local OCA-sponsored legislation that prohibits any government recognition
or promotion of homosexuals' rights or freedom from discrimination. In August
1993, the Oregon legislature passed a bill prohibiting these local ordinances but the
law is now being challenged by the OCA. See Keizer Approves Anti-Gay Measure, UPI,
Nov. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Oregon Cities Adopt Anti.Gay
Rights Measures, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 217, at D-20. (Nov. 12, 1993), available in
LEXMS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. The OCA has also attempted to start anti-gay
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regulate pornography, 9 to attacks on artists who use sexual themes
in their work,5" to debates over "family values" in national presi-
dential campaigns.5' As Kendall Thomas has noted:
Discussions of issues regarding sexuality that were conducted in
the rhetoric of privacy have increasingly come to be posed as
public issues about relations of power and domination. Struggles
over sexuality and its social meaning are now firmly fixed on our
national political agenda.5 2
The efforts of politicians and interest groups to censor sexual
expression only underscore the political significance of such
expression. The feminist initiative to regulate pornography, for
example, is directly predicated on pornography's political mes-
sage-the subordination and objectification of women.53 Indeed,
the collapse of a descriptively persuasive distinction between
political and sexual speech may be more generally attributed to
society's widespread adoption of an early feminist insight, now a
truism: the personal is political.
The distinction between sexual and political speech also makes
little sense in light of First Amendment principles. The only
rationale the Court has offered is that society finds sexual speech
less valuable than political speech. But the First Amendment
initiatives in Washington, Idaho, and California. See Bargreen, supra, at Fl.
49 See CATHARINEMACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 9 (1993) (claiming that "[p]rotecting
pornography means protecting sexual abuse as speech").
o See infra notes 78-84, 88-93 and accompanying text.
51 Both the Republican and Democratic parties appealed to "family values" in the
1992 presidential campaign. See Sheryl McCarthy, GOP Values: Getting Mean,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 19, 1992, at 20; Andrew Rosenthal, What's Meant and What's
Mean in the 'Family Values="Battle, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1992, § 4, at 1. At the 1992
Republican Convention, Pat Buchanan delivered a "family values" speech that directly
attacked gay rights, abortion, and feminism. See Tony Freemantle, Buchanan: Soul
of U.S. is at Stake, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 18, 1992, at B1.
52 Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1510
(1992) (citations omitted). Lynne Segal has similarly written: "Two things, at least,
are clear today. Sexuality is a battleground within mainstream politics as never before
in the twentieth century; and attitudes towards homosexuality are on the front-line."
LYNNE SEGAL, SLOW MOTION: CHANGING MASCULINrIES, CHANGING MEN 160(1990).
For interesting accounts of the interconnections of pornography and political
dissent in 16th to 18th century Europe, see Lynn Hunt, Introduction to THE
INVENTION OF PORNOGRAPHY: OBSCENITY AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERNITY, 1500-
1800, at 9 (Lynn Hunt ed., 1993). The United States, however, appears to lack such
a tradition; the use of sexual speech for expressly political purposes is a much more
recent phenomenon, largely traceable to the "coming out" of gays and lesbians. See
infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
5 See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th Cir.
1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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precludes precisely such value judgments; it is most needed to
protect that speech which the majority finds most offensive, least
valuable, and therefore least worthy of protection.54  Thus, to
suggest that sexual expression may be censored because "we" find
it less important than other speech is to deny First Amendment
protection exactly where it is needed.
B. Regulating Pornography as Sex Aid or Subordination
Several proponents of the regulation of sexual expression have
advanced a different rationale for according sexual expression
diminished constitutional protection, asserting that it is noncog-
nitive. Frederick Schauer, this theory's most ardent proponent,
argues that at least some sexual expression-hard-core pornogra-
phy-deserves no First Amendment protection because it is
"designed to produce a purely physical effect."55 He likens hard-
core pornography to a sexual aid, and suggests that since a vibrator
would not receive First Amendment protection, neither should
pornography." This argument rests on a purported distinction
'5 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) ("[T]he fact that society
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it
is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according
it constitutional protection."); STEVEN H. SHIFE1UN, THE FIRsT AMENDMENT, DEMOCRA-
CY, AND ROMANCE 108 (1990) (arguing that the First Amendment is designed to
protect dissenters from majoritarian values).
' Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity"; An Exercise in
the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899,922 (1979) [hereinafter
Schauer, Speech]; see U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 2 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 1275 (1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL] (drafted
by Schauer) ("Obscene materials lack cognitive content. .. ."); Frederick Schauer,
Response: Pornography and the First Amendment, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 605, 608 n.14
(1979) ("Direct sexual excitement can hardlybe said to contribute to the marketplace
of ideas . .."); see also John M. Finnis, "Reason and Passion".• The Constitutional
Dialectic of Free Speech and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 227 (1967) (obscenity
may be censored because it "pertains, not to the realm of ideas, reason, intellectual
content and truth-seeking, but to the realm of passion, desires, cravings and
titillation"); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DuKE LJ.
589, 603-04, 612-17 (arguing that pornography is regulable low-value speech because
it is noncognitive, does not intend to communicate an idea, is far afield from political
speech).
' Schauer argues:
The pornographic item is in a real sense a sexual surrogate. It takes pictorial
or linguistic form only because some individuals achieve sexual gratification
by those means.... Consider further rubber, plastic, or leather sex aids.
It is hard to find any free speech aspects in their sale or use. If pornogra-
phy is viewed merely as a type of aid to sexual satisfaction, any distinction
between pornography and so-called "rubber products" is meaningless.
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between communication designed to appeal to the intellect and
communication that generates sexual arousal.
Upon examination, however, this distinction collapses from both
sides. On the one hand, it exaggerates the intellectual character of
the nonsexual speech that the First Amendment fully protects.57
While one can understand why a law professor might find appealing
a claim that only speech that speaks to the intellect should be
protected, such a claim presumes an extremely parsimonious view
of communication. As Paul Chevigny has eloquently demonstrated,
the processes of persuasion, learning, and knowing are by no means
purely intellectual or rational.58 We comprehend the world as
much through intuitive judgments, emotional and aesthetic
responses, and stereotypic beliefs and images as through purely
rational deductions. 59
Some of the most influential forces in our culture do not make
an argument or appeal to the intellect: music, visual art, and a great
deal of advertising (including political advertising) contribute to the
"marketplace of ideas" through sound, imagery, and nonrational
appeals to passion and desire. It would be difficult to say that a
Madonna concert makes a strictly rational "argument," yet Mad-
onna's "communications" have had at least as great an effect on our
cultural and political life as most books of analytic philosophy or
political science. Poets and philosophers alike have recognized and
celebrated the "affective" power of art to produce sublime,
nonrational responses. ° Thus, one cannot restrict First Amend-
Schauer, Speech, supra note 55, at 922-23.
" In Texas v.Johnson, the Supreme Court rejected the dissent's argument that flag
burning should not be protected because it is merely an "inarticulate grunt." 491
U.S. 397, 432 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Far from being a case of 'one
picture being worth a thousand words,' flag burning is the equivalent of an
inarticulate grunt or roar that, it seems fair to say, is most likely to be indulged in not
to express any particular idea, but to antagonize others.").
' See Paul Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: A Reply to Cass Sunstein, 1989
DUKE L.J. 420; see also Stephen G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation
of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 1564, 1586-94 (1988) (exploring
logical inconsistencies in Schauer's view ofwhat is and is not speech); Susan E. Keller,
Viewing and Doing: Complicating Pornography's Meaning, 81 GEO. L.J. 2195, 2211
(1993) ("Chevigny maintains that so-called rational thought is actually accomplished
by intuition ... much the way he asserts pornography works."),
9 See Chevigny, supra note 58, at 423-26.
6 John Keats's poem, On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer, is just one example:
Much have I travelled in the realms of gold,
And many goodly states and kingdoms seen;
Round many western islands have I been
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ment protection to the rational or "cognitive" without ignoring what
works as persuasion in public discourse and vastly expanding the
government's power to censor.
On the other side of the balance, the argument that sexual
speech is "noncognitive" because it is designed to produce a
physical effect is predicated on an impoverished view of sexuality.
The argument implies that at base, sex is purely physical. But sex
cannot be stripped of its expressive elements: "Sexuality is as much
about words, images, ritual and fantasy as it is about the body: the
way we think about sex fashions the way we live it."6
Moreover, even if sex could be treated as purely physical,
Schauer's argument that pornography is no more than a sex aid
implies that pornographic images somehow work directly on the
sexual organs without any cognitive processing. If this were the
case, any depiction of nudity or sexual organs would be pornograph-
ic; there would be no difference between an anatomy textbook and
Penthouse. In fact, pornography "works" only because (and to the
extent that) it plays upon fantasies and narratives which the reader,
Which bards in fealty to Apollo hold.
Oft of one wide expanse had I been told
That deep-browed Homer ruled as his demesne:
Yet did I never breathe its pure serene
Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold:
Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken;
Or like stout Cortez, when with eagle eyes
He stared at the Pacific-and all his men
Looked at each other with a wild surmise-
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.
John Keats, On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer, reprinted in THE NEW OXFORD
BOOK OF ENGLISH VERSE 602 (Helen Gardner ed., 1972).
Shakespeare's Hamlet had a similar insight, although from a somewhat more
skeptical perspective:
Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit
That from her working all his visage wanned,
Tears in his eyes, distraction in his aspect...
[A]nd all for nothingl
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2 (John D. Wilson ed., Cambridge
University Press 2d ed. 1936); see also PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 277-86 (Allan Bloom
trans., 1968) (arguing that poets create unreal images which stimulate our emotions
at the expense of our reason). Seegenerally IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OFJUDGEMENT
(J.H. Bernard trans., 2d ed. rev. 1914).6 1JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: MEANINGS, MYTHS AND
MODERN SExuALITIEs 3 (1985).
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viewer, or listener finds arousing. Sexual expression, like human
sexuality itself, cannot be "purely physical." Rather, it is deeply and
inextricably interwoven with our identities, our emotions, our
upbringing, our relationships to other human beings, and the ever-
changing narratives and images that our community finds stimulat-
ing.
62
Thus, the argument that sexual expression can be usefully distin-
guished from political speech because it lacks "cognitive" appeal is
insupportable. Both political and sexual expression work in rational
and irrational ways and contribute to our culture, our ideology, and
our individual and collective identities through their rational and
irrational communicative content.
A related argument, advanced by antipornography feminists,
maintains that pornography-defined generally as "the graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women through pictures and/or
words "6 --can be regulated not because it triggers a physical re-
sponse, but because it is conduct. In Catherine MacKinnon's view,
pornography "is a form of forced sex," and "[t]he experience of the
(overwhelmingly) male audiences who consume pornography is
therefore not fantasy or simulation or catharsis but sexual reality:
the level of reality on which sex itself largely operates."" In this
view, pornography does not merely advocate violence toward women,
it is violence toward women, and therefore can be regulated without
62 The "purely physical" act of sex itself is also of course deeply imbued with
expressive meaning. Consider, for example, Richard Goldstein's discussion of
homosexual sex:
[Flor many gay men, fucking satisfies a constellation of needs that are dealt
with in straight society outside the arena of sex. For gay men, sex, that
most powerful implement of attachment and arousal, is also an agent of
communion, replacing an often hostile family and even shaping politics. It
represents an ecstatic break with years of glances and guises, the furtive past
we left behind.
Richard Goldstein, Heartsick: Fear and Loving in the Gay Community, VILLAGE VOICE,
June 28, 1983, at 9, 12.
' Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality,
8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 25 (1985) (presenting Model Anti-Pornography Law).
64 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 148-49 (1987) (citations omitted); see also MACKINNON, supra note 49, at 19
("Sooner or later, in one way or another, the consumers [of pornography] want to live
out the pornography further in three dimensions. Sooner or later, in one way or
another, they do."); id. at 28 ("In terms of what men are doing sexually, an audience
watching a gang rape in a movie is no different from an audience watching a gang
rape that is re-enacting a gang rape from a movie, or an audience watching any gang
rape."); id. at 13 ("Social inequality is substantially created and enforced-that is,
done-through words and images.").
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First Amendment concerns. This claim collapses the distinction
between the representation of subordination and subordination
itself, and relies on the legitimacy of regulating violent conduct as
an argument for regulating pornography.
Like Schauer's argument, MacKinnon's claim both proves too
much and explains too little. It proves too much because the
representation of subordination is by no means limited to pornogra-
phy. The subordination and objectification of women can be found
in virtually every form of expression, from commercial advertising
to rap music to fashion magazines to best-selling novels to television
sitcoms. Indeed, in a culture characterized by inequality, it would
be surprising if inequality were not expressed across all media.
Many of these forms of expression, moreover, eroticize hierarchy
and subordination, just as some pornography does. These "above-
ground" media may well be more influential in perpetuating
inequality than pornography, because they are more widely
disseminated and less subject to social opprobrium.
65
If the concern is subordination, why focus only on "graphic
sexually explicit" messages of subordination? What about implicit
sexual messages of subordination? And what about nonsexual
messages of subordination? Why should these be any less subject
to the censor's reach? As Robert Skipper has noted:
Inequality can and has been romanticized, glorified, celebrated,
patriotized, totemized, sacralized, proselytized, and aestheticized.
Each one of these techniques involves positively associating
inequality with a powerful action-guiding emotion. Why, then, is
the eroticization of inequality in a class by itself of tactics to be
censored?
66
MacKinnon's argument offers little justification for drawing the line
at pornography and, accordingly, would appear to justify broad
government regulation of speech that affirms or represents women's
subordination.
6 7
6See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72
TEx. L. REv. 1097, 1172-83 (1994) (arguing that mainstream images of women's
subordination are more prevalent and influential than pornography).
66 Robert Skipper, Mill and Pornography, 103 EThics 726, 728 (1993).
6' For example, MacKinnon argues:
When equality is recognized as a constitutional value and mandate, the idea
that some people are inferior to others on the basis of group membership
is authoritatively rejected as the basis for public policy. This does not mean
that ideas to the contrary cannot be debated and expressed. It should
mean, however, that social inferiority cannot be imposed through any
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MacKinnon's view of pornography also explains too little about
sex. It portrays pornography monolithically and presupposes that
the antiporn feminists' reading of pornography is pornography's
only possible meaning. In fact, like most modes of representation,
pornography has different effects on different readers. For some,
pornography is revolting on moral or religious grounds. Others
find it boring. Some-will see it, as MacKinnon does, as a source of
inequality. For still others, pornography may provide a "safe" way
to play out fantasies they would not want to act out in reality,
whether because acting out the fantasies would result in injury or
insult to self or others, because of the danger of sexually transmit-
ted diseases, or simply because of shyness or repression. Pornogra-
phy no doubt will incite some to engage in dangerous or violent
sexual practices, just as violent novels or films may spark some to
violence, but it is by no means evident that such a response is the
norm, much less the only response.6" Indeed, some feminists
report that they are aroused by images and fantasies of female
submission, even though in reality they clearly would not desire to
adopt such roles.69 Pornography and sexual fantasy are far more
means, including expressive ones.
MACKINNON, supra note 49, at 108. But MacKinnon does not tell us how to distin-
guish between debating or expressing social inferiority and "imposing" social
inferiority through "expressive" means. Advertisements and mainstream television
shows "express" subordinate roles for women at least as pervasively as "graphic
sexually explicit" pornography. MacKinnon offers no explanation for why making the
same message graphically sexually explicit transforms it from mere expression of an
idea into the imposition of inequality. The strength of MacKinnon's work lies in
revealing the pervasive role that expression plays in reinforcing inequality, but that
very insight makes the distinction she attempts to draw elusive.
s See generally Keller, supra note 58, at 2215-22 (describing differing responses to
pornography). Indeed, studies indicate that a significant percentage of viewers of
pornographic videos are women and there is little evidence that women are enacting
the sexual violence depicted:
[I]t is estimated that [women] now account for 40 per cent of all X-rated
video rentals, and a Redbook magazine survey confirms that nearly half the
women surveyed regularly watch porn films. Another poll estimates that
two out of three women in Germany and France watch video porn regularly.
Anne McClintock, Gonad the Barbarian and the Venus Flytrap: Portraying the Female and
Male Orgasm, in SEX EXPOSED, supra note 14, at 111, 130. A recent University of
Chicago survey reported that 23% of men and 11% of women admitted to having
purchased or rented an X-rated video during the past year. See EDWARD 0. LAUMANN
ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXuAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED
STATES 135 (1994).
69 See Lynne Segal, Sweet Sorrows, Painful Pleasures: Pornography and the Perils of
Heterosexual Desire, in SEX EXPOSED, supra note 14, at 65, 71; Duncan Kennedy, Sexual
Abuse Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309,
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complex than the antiporn feminists suggest, and cannot be
reductively equated with male domination over and violence
towards women.
70
This is not to say that MacKinnon and the antipornography
feminists are wrong about one of the central messages of much
pornography. MacKinnon's work in particular has played a key role
in moving the debate about pornography beyond concerns of
morality and focusing instead on the powerful messages of sexual
subordination that are often implicit and explicit in pornography.
Moreover, MacKinnon correctly identifies sex as a central element
in unequal relations between men and women, and has incisively
revealed the many ways in which this most "private" of human
practices, central to our individual identities, reinforces roles of
dominance and subordination. But it does not follow from that
insight that pornography is only what MacKinnon sees, any more
than it is only what Justice Stewart sees.
Each of these justifications for regulating sexual expression
attempts in its own way to categorically distinguish sexual expres-
sion from other speech, and argues that because of this distinction,
sexual speech does not deserve the usual measure of First Amend-
ment protection. The political-sexual distinction maintains that
while sexual expression may be speech, it is of low value. Schauer
and MacKinnon go further, suggesting that certain sexual expres-
sion should not be treated as speech at all, but as a form of
noncognitive sexual aid or direct subordination, regulable as
conduct. All of these arguments share with Justice Stewart's "I
know it when I see it" a common failing: they deny the multiplicity
of meanings that sexual expression can convey, and their arguments
rest on that reductivism.
These accounts of sexual speech themselves mark an attempt to
"control" sexual expression, by neatly confining it to a distinct
1391-92 (1992) (hypothesizing that men and women may have fantasies of submission
and/or domination when they are anxious or insecure about asserting themselves).
7' SeeJonathan Elmer, The Exciting Conflict: The Rhetoric of Pornography and Anti-
Pornography, 8 CULTuRAL CRITIQUE 45 (1987-88) (analyzing reductivist rhetoric of
antipornography feminist critics); see also Linda Williams, Pornographies on/Scene: Or
Diff'rent Strokes for DiFrent Folks, in SEx EXPOSED, supra note 14, at 233 (describing
the proliferation ofpornographies, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, sadomasochistic,
and hermaphroditic).
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category of communication. So confined, we can suppress it
without sacrificing First Amendment freedoms for more "impor-
tant" categories of speech. So confined, we can justify its regulation
with arguments that would be plainly unacceptable if applied across
the board to all forms of speech. So confined, we can "know it
when we see it," even if we cannot intelligibly define it.
The problem is that sexual speech cannot be so confined. That
is why justice Stewart could not define hard-core pornography, why
the Court itself has never tried to define sexually offensive speech,
why MacKinnon cannot explain her focus on "graphic sexually
explicit" messages of subordination, and why the Court's test for
obscene speech is incoherent. The sexual/political speech distinc-
tion and the sexual-speech-as-conduct argument can only be
asserted, not explained. Sexual speech eludes our attempts to
reduce it to a carefully bounded category. Yet precisely for that
reason-indeed, for reason itself-we feel compelled to try to control
it. Part II will examine the peculiar ways in which this compulsion
to control manifests itself in law.
II. THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL SPEECH REGULATION:
POLICING THE "INVASION OF PUBLICITY"
The classic explanation for the differential treatment of sexual
speech is that it is categorically less valuable than other speech. I
suspect, however, that sexual expression is granted reduced
constitutional protection not because it is less important but
because it is more threatening. Many of the most heated political
controversies in recent times have concerned sexual expression.
The very energy that government and various interest groups have
devoted to the repression of sexual expression reveals the threat it
poses. The threat appears to be greatest when sexual expression
challenges the line between the public and private spheres. When
sex, which is generally considered a private matter, invades the
public sphere, it sparks frenzied efforts to put it back in its private
place. A review of recent incidents of sexual repression reveals the
extent to which the regulatory impulse consists of maintaining a
public/private line with respect to sexual matters.
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A. Social Repression of Public Sexual Expression
All sexual expression at least potentially challenges the public/
private line. Pornography by definition contravenes the lines
society has drawn between public and private, by "representing" sex,
which is understood as private, for public consumption. Its most
ardent opponents object to pornography for precisely this reason.
For example, the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornogra-
phy, known as the "Meese Commission," stated that its concern was
limited to public distribution and display of pornography. To the
conservatives who dominated the Commission, "[e]ven images of
morally approved marital sexuality were judged 'degrading,' since
public viewing of what should be a private experience degraded the
couple and the sanctity of marriage."
7
Commission member Father Bruce Ritter made this connection
most transparently in a separate statement he attached to the
Report, entitled "Pornography and Privacy." Quoting George
Bernard Shaw's complaint that "[a]n American has no sense of
privacy," Ritter wrote:
If there is one single lesson we have learned from studying the
"problem of pornography," it may simply be that Mr. Shaw's acid
observations on American privacy may finally be coming true.
Commercially produced material, regularly distributed to millions
of Americans, shows other Americans, in explicit photographic
detail, engaged in every variety of sexual intercourse. What might
have been considered at one time the most private of human
activities is now a matter not simply for public discussion but for
graphic public display.
7 2
" Carole S. Vance, Negotiating Sex and Gender in the Attorney General's Commission
on Pornography, in SEX EXPOSED, supra note 14, at 29, 37. The Commission Report
stated:
Even insofar as [nonviolent and nondegrading] sexually explicit material
... is not perceived as harmful for the messages it carries or the symbols it
represents, the very publicness of what is commonly taken to be private is
cause for concern.... Here the concern is with the preservation of sex as
an essentially private act, in conformity with the basic privateness of sex
long recognized by this and all other societies.... [A]s soon as sex is put
on a screen or put in a magazine it changes its character, regardless of what
variety of sex is portrayed.
1 ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 55, at 340 (citations omitted). The members of the
Commission could not agree, however, on whether this harm alone was sufficient to
justify regulation of such expression. See id. at 341.
7 1 ATrORNEY GENERAL, supra note 55, at 117 (statement of Father Bruce Ritter);
see also id. at 36 (statement of Diane D. Cusack) ("We have a phenomenon today, in
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This understanding is not unique to the United States.
England's Williams Committee, which conducted an analogous
official study of pornography in England, described the danger of
pornography in remarkably similar terms:
Pornography crosses the line between private and public since it
makes available in the form, for instance, of a photograph, some
sexual act of a private kind and makes it available for a voyeuristic
interest: since it is itself a public thing, a picture book or a film
show, it represents already the projection into public of the pri-
vate world-private, that is to say, to its participants-of sexual
activity.
73
Indeed, for some the very definition of obscenity turns on the
line between public and private. Harry Clor has argued that
"obscenity consists in making public that which is private; it consists
in an intrusion upon intimate physical processes and acts or
physical-emotional states."74 To Clor, "the essence of the obscene
is its invasion of privacy."75 It might be more accurate to describe
obscenity as an invasion of the public realm by "private" matters, or
an "invasion of publicity," 76 because the point is to keep the public
realm free of offensive sexual expression. But in any event, the
sanctity of the public/private line is critical.
The centrality of the public/private line can also be seen in who
is targeted for repression. The most conspicuous targets of sexual
censors in recent years have not been traditional pornographers.
77
Rather, they have included gays and lesbians in the military who
have "come out" by expressing their sexuality; gay and lesbian
artists, including Robert Mapplethorpe, 7s David Wojnarowicz,
79
the pervasive presence of sexually explicit materials, that challenges one of those
understandings held by society for thousands of years-that sex is private.").
73 COMMITTEE ON FILM CENSORSHIP, FINAL REPORT, 1979, CMND 7772, 1 7.6.
74 HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 225 (1969).75 Id.
7 1 am indebted to Ellen Hertz for this phrase.
" The Meese Commission found in 1986 that "[t]he evidence is unquestionable
that with few exceptions the obscenity laws that are on the books go unenforced."
1 ATrORNEY GENERAL, supra note 55, at 366.
7' Robert Mapplethorpe, a gay photographer who died of AIDS in 1989, became
the focus of criticism when the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) provided
some funding for a retrospective of his works that included explicit depictions of gay
sex. See Michael Brenson, The Many Roles of Mapplethorpe, Acted Out in Ever-Shifting
Images, N.Y. TIMES,July 22,1989, reprinted in CULTURE WARS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE
RECENT CONTROVERSIES IN THE ARTS 68 (Richard Bolton ed., 1992) [hereinafter
CULTURE WARS]. In Cincinnati, local authorities went so far as to prosecute obscenity
charges against the Contemporary Art Center and its director, Dennis Barrie, for
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Todd Haynes,80 Marion Riggs, 81 John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and
Tim Miller;8 2 other artists who challenge traditional representa-
tions of sexuality, such as Karen Finley and Sally Mann;83 rap
displaying the Mapplethorpe retrospective. Thejury acquitted. See Elizabeth Hess,
Art on Trial: Cincinnati's Dangerous Theater of the Ridiculous, VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 23,
1990, reprinted in CULTURE WARS, supra, at 269.
" An essay by David Wojnarowicz, a multimedia artist who died of AIDS in 1993,
was singled out by NEA Chairman John Frohnmayer as one of his grounds for
revoking NEA funding from an exhibit at New York's Artists Space entitled, "Witness:
Against Our Vanishing." See JOHN FROHNMAYER, LEAVING TOWN ALIVE: CONFES-
SIONS OF AN ARTS WARRIOR 75-81 (1993).
The American Family Association (AFA) also targeted Wojnarowicz for attack.
See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). It took
partially cropped images (almost all representing homosexual sex) from an NEA-
funded catalogue of his work, created a pamphlet that purported to represent
Wojnarowicz's art work, and mailed the pamphlet to 523 members of Congress,
Christian leaders throughout the country, and the press. See id. at 134. Wojnarowicz
sued the AFA for misrepresenting the partial images as his artwork, and a federal
district court enjoined the AFA from distributing the pamphlet, requiring it to mail
a correction to everyone who had already received it. See id. at 149; see also C. CARR,
T2ying Times, in ON EDGE: PERFORMANCE AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
260 (1993) [hereinafter ON EDGE] (discussing Wojnarowicz).
o Todd Haynes directed Poison, a feature film depicting homosexual sex, with
support of the NEA. SeeJoyce Price, NEA-Funded Movie Repulses Conservatives, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1991, at A3; Paul Richter, The NRA Defends Funding of Controversial
Film, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1991, at Fl.
8' Marlon Riggs directed Tongues Untied, a documentary about gay black men
which appeared on public television and elicited substantial criticism. See Marc
Gunther, "Tongues" Could Touch OffNew Protests, ORLANDO SENTINELJuly 19, 1991,
at E6; Dick Williams, PBS Fare Tonight Shatters Bounds of Taste, Morality, ATLANTAJ.,
July 16, 1991, at A17. During the Republican presidential primaries, Pat Buchanan
used a clip of Tongues Untied to attack George Bush and the NEA. See Bill Hafferty,
Film Maker Reacts to Buchanan Commercial, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 28, 1992, at A8.
82 Fleck, Hughes, and Miller are gay and lesbian performance artists denied NEA
funding over concern that their controversial work would incur the wrath of right-
wing Congressmen. See Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp.
1457, 1461-62 (C.D. Cal. 1992). After losing a motion to dismiss and substantial
discovery, the NEA agreed to settle the individual artists' claims by awarding them
their grants, damages for unlawful release ofinformation from their application files,
and attorneys' fees. See Stipulation and Settlement Agreement dated June 9, 1993,
Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (on
file with author).
In 1992 the NEA selectively denied funding to three gay and lesbian film
festivals. See Diane Haithman, Lawsuit Possible as NEA Chief Kills Grants, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 1992, at F1; NEA Won't Fund 3 Gay Film Festivals, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 21,
1992, at 8. The funding was later reinstated after a change in presidential admini-
strations. See U.S. Arts Grants OKdfor Gay Film Fests, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 1993, at 16.
8 Karen Finley, the fourth performance artist denied NEA funding along with
Hughes, Fleck, and Miller, see supra note 82, addresses issues of women's sexuality
and gay and lesbian sexuality in her work. She directly challenges contemporary
culture's taboos about and objectification ofwomen's bodies by, among other things,
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groups with explicit sexual lyrics, such as 2 Live Crew; 4 AIDS
educators attacked for explicit safe-sex education materials;8 5 and
school boards challenged for introducing sex education materials
that teach tolerance for gays and lesbians.8 " All of these targets of
repression share a refusal to abide by the lines society has drawn
between private and public.
8 7
These speakers challenge the public/private line more funda-
mentally than do pornographers. In a sense, pornography knows its
place: it is distributed from red-light districts; it wraps its covers to
shield them from public attention; and it obeys fairly stringent, if
often unspoken, rules about what can and cannot be shown and
where it can and cannot be shown. The community has reached
something of a compromise with pornographers; pornographers can
performing in the nude in a wholly matter-of-fact way and performing a reverse strip-
tease, starting nude and gradually dressing as the performance progresses. See CARR,
Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts, in ON EDGE, supra note 79, at 121; Marcelle
Clements, Karen Finley's Rage, Love, Hate and Hope, N.Y. TIMES,July 22, 1990, at H5.
Sally Mann is a photographer who has been strongly condemned for taking
photographs of her daughter that some see as improperly erotic. See Richard B.
Woodward, The Disturbing Photography of Sally Mann, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 29.
' In 1988 Alabama prosecutors charged record store owner Tommy Hammond
with violating the obscenity laws by selling a 2 Live Crew record. A municipal judge
found Hammond guilty, but when Hammond won the right to a new trial before a
jury, he was acquitted. See MARJORIE HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO
AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP WARS 77 (1993). In Florida, 2 Live Crew was also charged
with obscenity for a concert performance but found not guilty. See id. at 79.
' See Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(declaring invalid a Centers for Disease Control provision requiring federally funded
AIDS education materials to be inoffensive to a majority of adults).
In 1993 four Washington, D.C., television stations refused to broadcast an
advertisement by the Whitman-Walker Clinic that advocated condom use. The
advertisement featured pictures of an unwrapped condom while voices recited a list
of slang names for it, and concluded with the tag line: "Condom. It doesn't matter
what you call it. Wear it." See Ellen Edwards, Four Local TV Stations Reject Clinic's
Condom Ad, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 1993, at C1. Condom advertisements received a
similar reaction in Boston. See Dolores Kong, AIDS Condom Ads Run into Opposition,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1993, at 29.
' In New York City in 1993, school board elections turned into a fight over the
teaching of sex education, AIDS education, and tolerance of homosexuality. See
Eleanor Randolph, Schools Become Religious War Zone: New York Liberals Fight Christian
Groups' Influence in Board Races, WASH. POST, May 4, 1993, at A3; see also Suzanne
Fields, Fourth R as in Respect, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1992, at El (criticizing New York
materials concerning tolerance of homosexuality).
" See also Jeffrey Toobin, Annals of Law: X-Rated, NEw YORKER, Oct. 3, 1994, at
70 (detailing the targeting of gay and lesbian bookstores by Canadian officials
enforcing obscenity statutes).
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and do flourish, as long as they know their proper place (the
"privacy" of homes and the "red-light districts" of towns).
By contrast, the artists, educators, and gay and lesbian soldiers
who have been targeted do not accept society's assigned place for
their expression. The artists perform not in red-light districts but
in "legitimate" public theaters such as Lincoln Center." Their
work appears not in obscure windowless bookstores, but in
distinguished public museums.8 9  They apply for community
support through public institutions such as the National Endowment
for the Arts, state arts agencies, and the Public Broadcasting
System. By celebrating the disruptive force and shock value of
sexual expression, they directly challenge the lines society has drawn
between art and pornography, the sexual and the political, the
private and the public." They demand to be treated like artists,
not pornographers.
9 2
To "come out" in any form is to challenge the public/private
line of "the closet," which conditions gay and lesbian participation
in the public sphere on concealing one's "private" sexual identity.
' See Clements, supra note 83, at H5 (previewing Karen Finley's performance at
Lincoln Center).9 See, e.g., Dennis Barrie, Pandering? That's Nonsense.... N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18,
1990, atA25 (Robert Mapplethorpe photographs in the permanent collections of the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Art Institute of Chicago, the Victoria and Albert
Museum in London, and the Centre National d'Art Georges Pompidou in Paris);
Holland Cotter, At the Whitney, Provocation and Theory Meet Head-On, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
13, 1993, at C23 (Andres Serrano photograph at the Whitney Museum of American
Art); Charles Hagen, Discovering a Range of Motion in the Still Image, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 1993, at C29 (David Wojnarowicz photographs at the Museum of Modern Art).
o See, e.g., Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 795 F. Supp. 1457 (C.D.
Cal. 1992).
91 See CARR, Introduction to ON EDGE, supra note 79, at xiii, xvii-iii (describing
"transgressive women performers who worked straight from the id to address issues
of power and control, who made themselves monstrous on stage, acting out every
definition of 'filthy' and 'mad'"); LYNDA NEAD, THE FEMALE NUDE: ART, OBSCENrrY
AND SEXUALITY 64-70 (1992) (describing feminist performance artists' use of the body
to challenge and subvert patriarchal conceptions of the representation of women).
As one critic described, Karen Finley
employs an archaic art form. She takes offher clothes .... Finley, however,
was not out to titillate or even to tingle spines....
... [She] transformed her naked body into a vehicle for her outrage at
society's failure to stop sexism, racism, homophobia and the hundreds of
other deep-seated hatreds that she sees eroding America.
Richard Huntington, A Brush With Fine Painting, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 27,1992, at El,
E3.
I Indeed, this may be their greatest sin, given the sharp lines society draws
between art and obscenity. See infra part III.D.
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The gay and lesbian community's refusal to accept the terms of the
closet has sparked a backlash of repression. Right-wing organiza-
tions like the American Family Association have attacked the NEA
for funding openly gay and lesbian artists." President Clinton's
half-hearted attempt to end the ban on gays in the military was
handily defeated. 4 Colorado passed an anti-gay ordinance,95 and
in Oregon a similar statewide law was only narrowly defeated. 6
Anti-gay violence, targeted against those who reveal their homosexu-
ality in public, has increased." And gays and lesbians continue to
be denied the opportunity to express their emotional commitments
in public ways historically granted to heterosexuals, such as mar-
riage.
98
The ongoing controversy over the right of gays and lesbians to
serve in the military reveals the threat that sexual expression poses
to the public/private line. Gays and lesbians assert their right to be
open participants in one of society's most esteemed "public" institu-
tions.9 9 Gays and lesbians have of course always served in the
"' See, e.g., American Family Association, Is This How You Want Your Tax Dollars
Spent?, advertisement in WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1990, reprinted in CULTURE WARS, supra
note 78, at 150; Bruce Selcraig, Reverend Wildmon's War on the Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
2, 1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 22.
94 See Chandler Burr, Friendly Fire: How Politics Shaped Policy on Gays in the
Militay, CAL. LAW., June 1994, at 54.
5 See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (enjoining the Attorney General
of Colorado from enforcing an anti-gay amendment to the Colorado Constitution).
'9 See George de Lama, States Take Pulse on Morality, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1992, at
18.
See Rose Marie Arce, Anti-Gay Violence Up, NEwSDAY (N.Y.),June 29, 1992, at
61; Marty Graham, Living in Fear: Hate Crimes Against Gays on Rise; Bigotry Fuels
Rising Tide of Mayhem, HOUSTON POST, Aug. 21, 1994, at A46. But cf. Survey Shows
Decline in Anti-Gay Incidents, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1994 at A2 (reporting a one-year
decrease in anti-gay violence after five years of steady increases).
s See William N. Eskridge,Jr., A Histoiy of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419,
1421 (1993) (noting that no state has recognized gay or lesbian marriage).
' See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
655 (1992) (challenging discriminatory treatment against military personnel on the
basis of their homosexuality); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989)
(same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (same), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847
F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990); Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d
1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); Meinhold v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455
(C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd and vacated in part, Nos. 93-55242, 93-56354,
1994 WL 467311 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994) (same). See generally RANDY SHILTS,
CONDUCT UNBECOMING (1993) (detailing numerous examples of harassment of
homosexuals in the military).
1994]
138 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 143:111
military, but only by concealing their sexual identities."' The
military has tolerated their presence as long as they remained in the
closet, as the following exchange between Congressman Barney
Frank and General Colin Powell demonstrates:
Cong. Barney Frank: For some time, as you know, the Secretary
[of Defense] has acknowledged, there have been gay men and
lesbians in the military. Is there any evidence of behavior
problems?
General Colin Powell: No, because as a matter of fact they have
kept, so-called, in the closet. It is quite a different thing when it
is openly practiced or openly known throughout the force and
within the units. I think it makes very difficult management
problems.'
0 1
Under the military's current "don't ask, don't tell" policy applicants
or soldiers are not asked whether they are gay, but if a soldier
expresses in any public way that he is gay, he will be presumptively
dischargeable unless he can prove that he is not.10 2 Thus, the
military's policy is directed not at homosexuality itself, but at the
expression of homosexuality to others.10
The AIDS crisis has provided still another focal point for battles
over public sexual expression. Groups such as Gay Men's Health
Crisis (GMHC) and ACT-UP have sought to bring to public
consciousness a problem that necessitates open public discussion
about heretofore private matters-namely, how and with whom one
has sexual relations. ACT-UP both constitutes a political response
to the AIDS crisis and demands a political response to the crisis
from government.' 4  GMHC engages in public education about
'o See generally SHILTS, supra note 99.
101 Fiscal Year 1993 Defense Budget: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Budget,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1992).
i See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654
(1993). By contrast, an assertion that one is heterosexual does not create any
presumption that one has engaged in prohibited heterosexual conduct (sodomy),
despite statistics suggesting that the vast majority of heterosexuals have engaged in
oral or anal sex. See LAUMANN, supra note 68, at 98-99 (finding that 76.6 % of men
and 67.7% of women admitted to having engaged in active oral sex, 78.7% of men
and 73.1% of women admitted to engaging in passive oral sex, and 25.6% of men and
20.4% of women admitted to engaging in anal sex).
... See generally David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to
Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994) (arguing that the military policy's focus on the public
expression of homosexuality violates the First Amendment).
"'o See Frederic M. Biddle, ACT UP's Last Act?, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 5, 1993
(Magazine), at 13 (describing ACT UP's tactics designed to increase governmental
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safe sex and seeks government support for its efforts., 5 The
threat of AIDS means that relegating sex to the private sphere may
have lethal consequences. Yet the public dissemination of safe-sex
educational materials remains controversial.
10 6
These disparate controversies all illustrate the extent to which
society is threatened by sex as a public subject. As Justice Stevens
explained in FCC v. Pacqfica Foundation: "Our society has a tradition
of performing certain bodily functions in private, and of severely
limiting the public exposure or discussion of such matters. Verbal
or physical acts exposing those intimacies are offensive .... "107
For the most part, social regulation is directed not at sex itself, but
at its public representation, whether in pornography, art addressing
sexual issues, sex education, or gays and lesbians "coming out."
Time and time again, the censor's targets are those who refuse to
accept the public/private line.
awareness of AIDS and to spur progress in AIDS research).
105 See Gay Men's Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
[hereinafter GMHC II] (challenging grant restrictions on AIDS education); Gay Men's
Health Crisis v. Sullivan, 733 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) [hereinafter GMHC 1]
(same).
0 In 1987, for example, Senator Jesse Helms, reacting to explicit safe-sex
educational materials created by GMHC (without federal funds), sponsored an
amendment that provided that no federally funded AIDS education materials could
"promote or encourage, directly, or indirectly, homosexual sexual activity." More Gay
Bashing, NATION, Oct. 31, 1987, at 473 (quoting the Helms Amendment). Since a
central purpose of AIDS education is to encourage "safe" sexual activity, and since
the gay community was especially at risk, AIDS educators viewed this provision as
undermining the purpose ofAIDS education. Yet the amendment passed the Senate
94-2. See Limit Voted on AIDS Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1987, at B12.
After a barrage of criticism, Congress amended the Helms Amendment the
following year. Even this subsequent amendment, however, demonstrated ambiva-
lence on the subject of public support for safe-sex education. Congress removed
"indirectly" from the prohibition, but added a prohibition on materials that encour-
aged heterosexual, as well as homosexual, sexual activity. See GMHC I, 733 F. Supp.
at 626. The provision now mandated that federally funded materials "not be
designed to promote or encourage, directly, intravenous drug abuse or sexual activity,
homosexual or heterosexual." GMHC II, 792 F. Supp. at 284 n.12. On the face of
it, Congress had transformed an anti-gay law into an anti-sex law. Only under the
cover of that amendment was Congress able to enact language assuring that this
prohibition would not bar the creation and distribution of material educating persons
in the techniques of safe sex. See id. at 288 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §300ee(d) (1988)).
Thus, while the AIDS crisis has forced sexual expression into the public sphere and
has led to public sponsorship of explicit sexual speech, the transformation has been
exceedingly difficult, reflecting continuing social concerns about transgressing the
public/private line. See generally RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 148-60
(1987) (describing initial official reluctance to address AIDS as a problem).
107 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 n.23 (1978).
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B. First Amendment Doctrine and the Public/Private Line
The Court's sexual expression decisions can be organized along
a similar public/private axis. The Court's zoning decisions allow
communities to demand that when sexually explicit speech appears
in public, it must be relegated to dark and distant parts of town."'
The Court's affirmance of the FCC's "indecency" regulation permits
the zoning of sexual speech to less "public" times of day.'0 ' And
while private possession of obscenity cannot be regulated, °10 the
state is free to regulate obscenity in a public place even if it is
enjoyed only by consenting adults, and even where it is only being
transported through public channels for private home use."'
What is immune from regulation in private becomes suppressible in
public, even if the very same speakers, listeners, and speech are
involved.
The centrality of the public/private line to obscenity doctrine is
most vividly reflected in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton.12 In that
case, the Court reviewed an obscenity prosecution directed at an
adult movie theater that exhibited films to consenting adults
only."1 The theater owners argued that because no unwilling
viewer would be confronted by the films, their exhibition should be
treated like Mr. Stanley's" 4 possession of obscene materials in the
privacy of his home." 5 The Court "categorically" rejected that
argument, holding that the state has a "long-recognized legitimate
interest in regulating the use of obscene materials in local commerce
and in all places of public accommodation.""6 The Court quoted
Alexander Bickel's explanation of the distinction between public
and private enjoyment of obscenity:
Ios See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
109 See Pacflica, 438 U.S. at 748-51 (upholding the constitutionality of an FCC
prohibition on indecent radio broadcasts during times when children are likely to be
exposed to them).
See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973) (holding that
obscene films may be criminally proscribed where exhibited in public, even if shown
only to consenting adults); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413
U.S. 123, 128-29 (1973) (holding that Congress may prohibit the importation of
obscene materials intended for private use).
112 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
113 See id. at 51.
H4 See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558.
n5 See 413 U.S. at 65.
"' Id. at 57 (emphasis added); see also id. at 65 (distinguishing Stanley on the
ground that movie theaters are public accommodations).
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"A man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room, or
expose himself indecently there .... We should protect his
privacy. But if he demands a right to obtain the books and
pictures he wants in the market, and to foregather in public
places-discreet, if you will, but accessible to all-with others who
share his tastes, then to grant him his right is to affect the world about
the rest of us, and to impinge on other privacies. Even supposing that
each of us can, if he wishes, effectively avert the eye and stop the
ear (which, in truth, we cannot), what is commonly read and seen
and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or not.""
7
Neither Bickel's quote nor the Court's opinion adequately
explains why there should be a distinction between showing an
obscene film in a home, into which any number of consenting
others may be invited, and showing the same film in a theater open
only to the same consenting adults. If "what is commonly read and
seen and heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or not," what
difference does it make whether it is "commonly" seen in private
homes rather than movie theaters?"' In a familiar pattern, the
distinction is asserted, but left unexplained.
The policing of the public/private line also underlies the Court's
holdings that while the state may not punish the possession of
obscenity in the home, it may punish any attempt to get obscenity
to the home. After Stanley, several lower courts struck down limits
on the importation or distribution of pornography for personal
use.1 1 9 They reasoned, not illogically, that if one has a constitu-
tional right to enjoy pornography in the home, surely one must have
the right to obtain pornography for private home use. °20  The
'
7 Id. at 59 (quoting Alexander Bickel, On Pornography II: Dissenting and
Concurring Opinions, 22 PUB. INTEREST 25, 26 (1971)).
"' As David Richards has pointed out, Bickel's argument "rests on the crude
moral confusion between an obtrusive offense and the offense derived from the mere
knowledge of something." David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward
a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 86 (1974); see also H.L.A.
HART, LAw, LiBERTY AND MORALrry 46-47 (1963) (distinguishing between offense
caused by unwanted public exposure and offense caused merely by knowing that
people are engaging in conduct of which one disapproves).
1'9 See United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 309 F. Supp. 36,37-38 (C.D.
Cal. 1970) (striking down statute barring obscenity importation), rev'd, 402 U.S. 363,
370-71 (1971); United States v. Orito, 338 F. Supp. 308, 310-11 (E.D. Wis. 1970)
(holding unconstitutional a statute that barred the private, interstate transportation
of obscenity for personal use), vacated, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973); United States v.
Lethe, 312 F. Supp. 421,425-26 (E.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that it is unconstitutional
to prosecute an individual for mailing obscene materials to individuals who request
them).
120 See, ag, Orito, 338 F. Supp. at 310 ("[lIt follows that with the right to read
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Supreme Court rejected that logic, insisting that the line Stanley
drew ended at the home's threshold, and could not be extended
into the public sphere of distribution and importation.'1 ' The
Court warned of the "seductive" danger of such reasoning, and
insisted that a sharp line must be drawn:
The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary
development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third,
fourth, or fifth "logical" extension occurs.... This kind of
gestative propensity calls for the "line drawing" familiar in the
judicial, as in the legislative process: "thus far but not beyond."
Perspectives may change, but our conclusion is that Stanley
represents such a line of demarcation .... 122
Here, the Court effectively admits that there is no logical basis for
barring distribution and importation of obscenity for personal use,
but insists that a (one is tempted to say "prophylactic") line must be
drawn at the public/private threshold to ward off the "gestative
propensity" of "seductive" reasoning.
A similar reliance on the public/private distinction helps explain
one of the Court's most curious obscenity decisions, Ginzburg v.
United States.123 Ralph Ginzburg was sentenced to five years in
prison for distributing three items, none of which was obscene, 24 on
obscene matters comes the right to transport or to receive such material when done
in a fashion that does not pander it or impose it upon unwilling adults or upon
minors.").
121 See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973) (upholding statute barring
distribution of obscenity in interstate commerce, even if only for personal use);
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973)
(upholding customs statute barring importation of obscenity, even if only for personal
use); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 352 (1971) (upholding statute barring
distribution of obscenity through mails, even if directed only at consenting adults);
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (plurality
upholding customs statute prohibiting importation of obscenity, including obscenity
imported for personal use).
12 200 Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. at 127.
1 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
124 The first item was EROS, a book of articles and photo-essays on the subject of
love, sex, and sexual relations. See id. at 466. Of the book's 15 articles and essays,
the district court found that only four were obscene. See id. at 471. The second item
was Liaison, a newsletter that included an interview with a psychotherapist who
favored broad license in sexual relationships, and digests of two articles from
professional sex journals. See id. at 466-67. The third item was The Housewife's
Handbook on Selective Promiscuity, an autobiographical account that addressed such
issues as sex education for children, the legitimacy of laws regulating private
consensual adult sex, and the equality of women in sexual relationships. See id. at
466-67. The Supreme Court assumed that the publications standing alone were not
obscene. See id. at 465-66.
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the ground that he engaged in "pandering" by (truthfully) emphasiz-
ing their sexual character in advertising them to the public. Had
Ginzburg distributed the items only through professional psycho-
therapists for use in sex therapy, his actions would have been
constitutionally protected. His error was to distribut6 these private
materials in the public, commercial marketplace. Just as the same
film is protected if viewed in the privacy of one's home but not if
shown in a public theater, so the same materials are protected if
distributed in a controlled, private therapeutic setting, but not if
introduced candidly as sexual into the public marketplace.
C. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.: Drawing Fine Lines
The most recent example of the Court's sanctioning of public/
private policing is Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,'25 in which the
Court upheld an Indiana "public nudity" statute that required nude
dancers to wear pasties and a G-string. This case is about nothing
but the public/private line; as Justice Scalia noted, "Indiana bans
nudity in public places, but not within the privacy of the home."
126
The Court's judgment in Barnes rested tenuously on three separate
opinions-ChiefJustice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, joined only by
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, and two separate concurrences by
Justices Scalia and Souter. Virtually the only point of agreement
between the five Justices who made up the majority was that
Indiana's law was unrelated to the suppression of expression.
127
Reaching this conclusion was necessary to uphold the statute
because the Court had previously recognized nude dancing as
expressive conduct,12' and had recently reaffirmed that where
regulation of expressive conduct is related to its communicative
aspects, it violates the First Amendment absent a compelling state
interest.1 29 But the conclusion is highly dubious.
1- 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
12 6 Id. at 576 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring).
" See id. at 568 (plurality opinion); id. at 576 (Scalia,J., concurring); id. at 585-86
(Souter, J., concurring).12
1 See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) ("[N]ude
dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation.");
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,932 (1975) (stating that nude dancing involves
"the barest minimum of protected expression," but is "entitled to First and
Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances"); California v. LaRue,
409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (same).
12 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny
to Minnesota law prohibiting the display of racist symbols because law was designed
to suppress what symbols communicated); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
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Rehnquist and Scalia reasoned that the state's interest in
regulating public nudity was unrelated to expression because the
state sought to protect "societal order and morality."' Neither
Justice explained, however, how public nudity harms public morality
other than by virtue of what it expresses. Scalia insisted that the
ban was unrelated to expression because it "generally" prohibited
public nudity, irrespective of its message."' But Scalia's use of
"generally" is question-begging. The Indiana law does not "general-
ly" prohibit all nudity, but singles out public nudity, that is, nudity
communicated to others in public.
Ordinarily, where government selectively regulates public but
not private conduct or expression, there is reason to suspect that
the government is attempting to suppress the message communicat-
ed to the public, and strict scrutiny is triggered. In Texas v.
Johnson,"s2 for example, the fact that the Texas statute prohibited
only those flag burnings that would "seriously offend one or more
persons likely to observe or discover"' 3 the conduct led the Court
to conclude that the government's regulatory interest was related to
the message that the conduct expressed, and therefore to apply
stringent First Amendment scrutiny.134  By contrast, in United
States v. O'Brien,3 5 the Court justified application of relaxed
scrutiny to a statute prohibiting destruction of draft cards by noting
that the law "does not distinguish between public and private
destruction, and it does not punish only destruction engaged in for
317-18 (1990) (applying strict scrutiny to statute criminalizing flag burning because
law was designed to suppress what flag burning communicated); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1989) (same).
IS Barnes, 501 U.S. at 568; see also id. ("Public indecency statutes... reflect moral
disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places."); id.
at 575 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the law's purpose was "to enforce the
traditional moral belief that people should not expose their private parts indiscrimi-
nately").
131 Id. at 575 n.3.
152 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
3
5 Id. at 400 n.1; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
801-02 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that the flag as a "national symbol" would not be
"corrupted" in any way by "closet" burnings, but that "the symbol is degraded, if at
all, only to the degree that people learn of the act");John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A
Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1496-1502 (1975) (arguing that regulation of public flag
desecration turns on the message it communicates to others and therefore violates
the First Amendment); Melville E. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the
First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 53-57 (1973) (same).
'" See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405-06.
15 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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the purpose of expressing views.""3 6 Like the flag burning statute
in Johnson and unlike the draft card law in O'Brien, Indiana banned
only public nudity, and did not attempt a general regulation of
nudity.
3 7
Chief Justice Rehnquistjustified his conclusion that the suppres-
sion of expression was not intended by claiming that "[p]ublic
nudity is the evil the state seeks to prevent, whether or not it is
combined with expressive activity."' But public nudity has no
effect on public morals except by virtue of what it expresses to
136 Id. at 375.
'Justice Scalia's suggestion that flag burning is different from public nudity
because the former is "inherently expressive" misses the mark. Barnes, 501 U.S. at
577 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring). He suggests that
[iut is easy to conclude that conduct has been forbidden because of its
communicative attributes when the conduct in question is what the Court
has called "inherently expressive," ... [that is,] conduct that is normally
engaged in for the purpose of communicating an idea, or perhaps an emo-
tion, to someone else.
Id. Nudity, he claims, "is not normally engaged in for the purpose of communicating
an idea or an emotion." Id.
There are two flaws with this argument. First, even accepting what Scalia states,
his inquiry ends too soon. If government restricts certain conduct because of what it
expresses, it should not matter whether the conduct is "normally" engaged in for
expressive purposes.
Second, Indiana has not prohibited nudity, butpublic nudity. And public nudity
may well be "inherently expressive." Certainly we all understand our daily decisions
about what to wear as expressive: we wear tuxedos to express one thing, judicial
robes to express something else, and hot-pinkjumpsuits to express something else
again. In fact, the entire fashion industry is predicated on the notion that we express
ourselves (and our culture) through what we wear. Moreover, what we do not wear
may be at least as expressive as what we do wear: recall Brooke Shields's advertise-
ment for Calvin Kleinjeans, in which she stated, "Nothing comes between me and my
Calvins." If a decision to wear lingerie as outerwear is expressive, see Phyllis C. Lowe,
Bras: More Than Just Supporting Roles, L.A. TIMES (ORANGE COuNTY EDITION), Sept.
18, 1992, at E3 (celebrating the evolution of the bra from hidden support device to
"outwear essential"); Peter Mikelbank, Haute Gauche: The Trash Master, WASH. POST,
July 17, 1993, at Fl, F5 (discussing the recent popularity of "trash" fashion-a move-
ment among designers to convey "sex, silliness and bad taste" through their clothes),
so too is a decision to wear nothing, see Patricia McLaughlin, Can We Change Our
Outlook About the Nature of Breasts?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Aug. 23, 1993, at 1E
(recognizing public toplessness as a political statement about the need to de-eroticize
breasts in order to address unhealthy fetishization of the female body); Carlin Meyer,
Women's Breasts: So What?, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at A21 (arguing that laws
prohibiting women from baring their breasts in public are enactments of a thinly
veiled puritan morality that perpetuates deviant sexual behavior and unhealthy
notions about the female body instead of curbing them). Indeed, in a society where
the norm is to cover oneself up, it would be almost impossible to appear nude in
public without intending to express something by one's actions.
138 Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571.
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those who see it: offensiveness, immodesty, sensuality, disrespect
for social mores, etc. If public nudity expressed nothing, society
would have no interest in suppressing it. It is only because public
nudity is expressive that it is regulated.
Justice Souter's rationale for finding the Indiana law "unrelated
to the suppression of expression"'3 9 is no less strained. He
reasoned that because Indiana might have determined that
forbidding nude barroom dancing would further its "interest in
preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and associated crimes,"
140
the public nudity law should be viewed as directed at those
secondary effects, and not at nude dancing's expressive ele-
ments.'4 1 In order to reach this result, Souter had to clear several
hurdles.
First, there was no indication that Indiana actually sought to
further these interests. Second, there was no basis for believing that
the secondary effects Justice Souter identified as flowing from nude
dancers would be mitigated by pasties and a G-string. If bars
featuring nude dancing attract "prostitution, sexual assault, and
associated crime," it is difficult to see why bars featuring nude
dancing under a pasties-and-G-string regime would not. Third, the
public nudity law on its face extended beyond nude barroom
dancing, reaching instances of public nudity-such as skinny-dipping,
nude sunbathing, and "streaking"-with no connection to the
secondary effects Souter posited as the law's justification. Although
Scalia and Rehnquist relied on what they viewed as the law's
"general" scope to support their determination that the statute was
not targeted at suppressing the erotic messages of nude dancers,
Souter relied on the law's specific application to nude barroom
dancers to uphold it as a regulation directed at the secondary effects
of nude dancing.'4 2 In essence, the Justices upheld different laws.
The nude dancing law Souter upheld would fail under Rehnquist
'9 Id. at 585 (Souter,J., concurring) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968)).
"I Id. at 584.
141 See id. at 586.
4 Justice Souter maintained that he could ignore the broad facial scope of the law
"[b]ecause there is no overbreadth challenge before us," id. at 585 n.2, but that
rationale does not withstand scrutiny. The critical question is whether the state's
interest in enacting the public nudity ordinance is "related to the suppression of
expression." Id. at 585. Where the law on its face extends far beyond the asserted
"nonexpressive" secondary effects posited, that fact suggests that the law is not in fact
directed at the secondary effects, but at the communicative impact of public nudity
per se. See id. at 586.
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and Scalia's analysis, which was predicated on the law generally
banning all public nudity. And the law that Rehnquist and Scalia
upheld would have failed Justice Souter's test, because Indiana
could not possibly demonstrate secondary effects with respect to all
public nudity.
Finally, and most problematically, even if nude barroom dancing
has the effects Souter identified, those effects are not "secondary,"
but are directly linked to its communicative content. Where
government regulates speech because its content is said to cause
harmful effects, the government must satisfy the Brandenburg v. Ohio
test;14 here, Indiana would have had to show that nude dancing
was directed to causing unlawful conduct, and was likely to produce
that effect imminently.1 44  In response to this concern, Souter
opined that the effects might not have been caused by, but only
correlated with, the nude dancing, thereby obviating the need to
apply Brandenburg:
It is possible, for example, that the higher incidence of prostitu-
tion and sexual assault in the vicinity of adult entertainment
locations results from the concentration of crowds of men
predisposed to such activities, or from the simple viewing of nude
bodies regardless of whether those bodies are engaged in expres-
sion or not. In neither case would the chain of causation run
through the persuasive effect of the expressive component of nude
dancing.
145
Putting aside the wisdom of grounding First Amendment
protection on an evanescent distinction between effects caused by
or correlated with speech, each of the possibilities Souter identified
is inextricably tied to nude dancing's expressive character. If "the
simple viewing of nude bodies" has any effect, it must be by virtue
of what the nude bodies communicate visually. Similarly, if nude
dancing attracts a crowd of predisposed men, it must be because
they are drawn to what nude dancing communicates to them, unless
one believes that nude dancers have some magnetic force of
143 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the
regulation of advocacy of illegal conduct except where speech is intended and likely
to produce imminent unlawful behavior).
'" See e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333 (7th Cir.
1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (striking down an antipornography ordinance
justified by the concern that pornography causes violence toward women on the
ground that the state had not shown a sufficiently close connection between the
expression and the violence to satisfy the Brandenburg test).
" Barnes, 501 U.S. at 586.
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attraction irrespective of what they communicate. What is going on
may not be "persuasive" in the strictly rational sense, but the First
Amendment is not restricted to protecting rational persuasion.
146
Thus, all of the Justices in the Barnes majority strained mightily
to reach the conclusion that the regulation at issue was unrelated to
the suppression of expression. In an exchange with the Barnes
dissenters, Justice Scalia provides a clue as to why the Justices were
driven to such great lengths. The dissent had argued that the
Indiana law was unconstitutional, at least as applied to nude
barroom dancing, because such an application had nothing to do
with avoiding offense to nonconsenting parties, and therefore "the
only remaining purpose must relate to the communicative elements
of the performance." 14 Scalia responded:
Perhaps the dissenters believe that "offense to others" ought to be
the only reason for restricting nudity in public places generally,
but there is no basis for thinking that our society has ever shared
that Thoreauvian "you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-
injure-someone-else" beau ideal-much less for thinking that it was
written into the Constitution.1
4
Invoking the remarkable image of "60,000 fully consenting adults
crowded into the Hoosier Dome to display their genitals to one
another," Scalia maintained that such an event could be prohibited
"even if there were not an offended innocent in the crowd." 141
He argued that "[o]ur society prohibits, and all human societies
have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but
because they are considered, in the traditional phrase, 'contra bonos
mores,' i.e., immoral," and one of those activities is public exposure
of one's private parts.'5 0
Thus, Scalia not only accepts the public/private line, he makes
it a moral imperative. But one might as easily say flag burning,
criticizing one's elected leaders, and blasphemy are "immoral." The
First Amendment usually demands more than a Latin phrase to
1 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971); supra part I.B.
"I Barnes, 501 U.S. at 574 (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing dissent's
position). In fact, the dissent conceded too much: even where offense to others is
a rationale for regulation, such a regulation is related to the suppression of
expression where the offense is generated by what is communicated. SeeJohnson, 491
U.S. at 414.
"Barnes, 501 U.S. at 574-75.49 Id. at 575.
150 Id.
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justify the regulation of expression and specifically bars regulation
based solely on a judgment that the expression is immoral."'
Thus, the majority was driven to find the Indiana statute "unrelated
to expression" because it otherwise could not have upheld the law
as a regulation of morals.
1 52
Left unstated is how requiring otherwise nude dancers to don
pasties and G-strings will uphold the morals of the community. The
moral difference between an entirely nude dancer and a dancer
wearing pasties and a G-string is not immediately apparent. But the
pasties and G-string do serve an important symbolic function: they
insist that the law is present in this public space, very literally
enforcing a line, albeit a very fine one. The thinness of the line is
ultimately less important than the fact that the line exists. The
statute regulates the public sphere precisely by demanding that
dancers keep their "private parts" private, but only in the most
minimal sense. Thus, the pasties and G-string are an apt metaphor
for the regulation of sexual expression: they symbolically police the
public sphere by barring certain "private" topics from surfacing,
even as they permit (and possibly even increase the desirability of)
regulated sexual expression in the public sphere. They reflect
. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684,
687 (1959) (holding that the state may not bar exhibition of the film Lady Chatterley's
Lover on the ground that it "'portrays acts of sexual immorality ... as desirable,
acceptable or proper patterns of behavior'" (quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 157 N.E.2d 197, 197 (N.Y. 1958))); see also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15,22-23 (1971) (invalidating state regulation of public profanity
that was justified on moral grounds).
52 Similarly, none of the majority opinions in Barnes would stand up had the
Justices not relied on an implicit distinction between sexual and political expression.
Souter was most forthright about relying on this distinction, twice noting that his
"secondary effects" analysis is applicable "at least in the context of sexually explicit
expression" because such expression "maybe of lesser societal importance." Barnes,
501 U.S. at 586 & n.3 (Souter,J., concurring). The Supreme Court has in fact never
relied on the "secondary effects" rationale to uphold the regulation of nonsexual
speech, and it seems likely that if a town said it had banned a communist bookstore
because it attracted unsavory characters, reduced property values, and was vaguely
correlated to an increased risk of property crimes, the Court would not uphold such
a ban as a content-neutral regulation of "secondary effects." Rehnquist's and Scalia's
opinions would be equally implausible as applied to conventionally "political"
expressive activity. Had Indiana sought to bar its citizens from wearing political
symbols or clothing in public, cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (invalidating school regulation barring wearing of black arm-
bands), on the ground that such conduct undermined "morals and public order,"
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569, it is unlikely that the Court would have found Indiana's law
"unrelated to the suppression of expression." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407
(1989).
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society's compromise on sexual expression: such expression may
remain relatively free in the private sphere, but its public expres-
sion, although far from forbidden altogether, must be subject to
legal regulation."' The Court has in turn sanctioned that
compromise, but in order to do so it has had to invert the First
Amendment.
D. Inverting the First Amendment
As we have seen, the Court's principal justification for permit-
ting the regulation of sexual expression in the public sphere is that
it is not political speech." 4 That justification is nothing more
than a restatement of the public/private line; it maintains that
sexual speech is neither a matter for public debate, nor an "essential
part of any exposition of ideas."155 But the laws upheld under this
rationale are themselves designed to keep sexual expression out of
the public sphere. Thus, the Court justifies the state's power to
keep sexual expression "private" by relying on the nonpublic
"nature" of sexual expression. Sexual expression's "private"
character, however, is neither natural nor inevitable, but socially
determined and reinforced by the very regulations that the Court
reviews. 5 The Court's rationale for allowing the regulation of
"' Great Britain drove a similar "bargain" in the aftermath of the 1957 Wolfenden
Report, which advocated decriminalization of private consensual sex between adults,
but acknowledged the legitimacy of penalties for public displays of sexuality. See
JEFFREY WEEKS, SEX, POLITICS AND SOCIETY: THE REGULATION OF SEXUALITY SINCE
1800, at 243 (1981) (discussing the harsher penalties for public sexual behavior and
decriminalization of private acts that resulted from the Wolfenden Report); see also
SIMON WATNEY, POLICING DESIRE: PORNOGRAPHY, AIDS, AND THE MEDIA 60-61 (2d
ed. 1989) (arguing that the Wolfenden Report led to obsessive policing of "public"
places in exchange for private freedom).
" See supra part I.A.
15 Paris AdultTheatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 n.12 (1973) (quoting Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
1" Both conservative and liberal critics recognize that the delineations we con-
struct between public and private spheres are chosen, not natural, and that these
choices bear significant social consequences. See e.g., CLOR, supra note 74, at 200
(arguing that the public/private distinction collapses because civil society has a stake
in encouraging and discouraging private sexual activity); LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE
ENFORCEMENT -OF MORALS 7-25 (1965) (rejecting claim that there is a private realm
of sexuality immune from government control); Ruth Colker, Pornography and Privacy:
Towards the Development of a Group Based Theory for Sex Based Intrusions of Privacy, 1
LAw & INEQ. J. 191, 198-213 (1983) (advancing a feminist critique of the public/
private distinction); Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction
in American Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 237, 238 (1987) (emphasizing that the
public/private distinction is socially constructed); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
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public sexual expression is therefore circular.
The Court's justification for protecting sexual expression in the
private sphere is equally problematic. Here, the First Amendment
prohibits the state from intruding upon expressive interests because
(and only so long as) they are privately expressed. 157 But propo-
nents of regulation maintain that private sexual expression has a
distinctly public effect. Conservatives identify its detrimental
influence on public morality,' while feminists point to porno-
graphy's role in enforcing women's subordinate status.159 Thus,
just as the assertion that sexual speech is not political cannot in
itself justify excluding sexual speech from public debate, so the
assertion that sexual speech is private is insufficient to explain the
Court's protection of such expression in the private sphere.
The public/private line that the Court has endorsed is not, of
course, unfamiliar. In liberal society generally and American cul-
ture in particular, the "private" sphere is generally seen as relatively
free from government control, while the "public" sphere is subject
to regulation. 6 ' The Court's doctrinal approach to sexual expres-
sion neatly traces that distinction. Indeed, many of those who have
Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward FeministJurisprudence, 8 SIGNs 635, 656-57
(1982) (discussing the social creation and implications of the public/private
construct); Louis M. Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for
a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1006 (1987)
(questioning the validity of the public/private construct).
... See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1968) ("Whatever the power of the
state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts.").
'" See CLOR, supra note 74, at 200-07 (contending that government cannot remain
neutral toward sexual expression even in the private sphere); DEVLIN, supra note 156,
at 11 (arguing that society may use law to protect public morality because such
morality is essential to societal vitality); see also Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and
the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 671 (1963) ("[T]he great majority of
people believe that the morals of 'bad' people do, at least in the long run, threaten
the security of the 'good' people. Thus, they believe that it is their own business they
are minding.").
... See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 64, at 146-62 (examining the tangible harms
caused to women by the private consumption of pornography).
1 See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 6 (1992) ("[A] central sense of the public/private distinction contrasts
freedom with interference. Here, the 'private' is the 'free,' the sphere in which others
do not interfere."); Robert H. Mnookin, The Public/Private Dichotomy: Political
Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1982)
(describing the private sphere as "presumptively outside the legitimate bounds of
government coercion and regulation" and the public sphere as a place "where
government has a legitimate role").
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opposed the regulation of obscenity argue, on libertarian grounds
inspired by John Stuart Mill, that the private consumption of
pornography should not be subject to government regulation
because it does not inflict tangible harm on others. 6 '
But while the public/private line may be familiar from liberal
political theory, from a First Amendment standpoint it is perverse.
The First Amendment protects public values; one of its central
purposes is to protect an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"
public debate. 6 2 While some of the values furthered by the First
Amendment, such as self-realization and autonomy, 163 apply in
both the private and public spheres, others have a distinctly public
character. Both Alexander Meiklejohn's view of the First Amend-
ment as a guarantee of speech essential to self-government and
Vincent Blasi's conception of a guarantee of speech that functions
to check abuses by government officials imply increased protection
for expression in the public sphere. 164 So too does Lee Bollinger's
vision of the First Amendment as educating the citizenry about
tolerance; 165 tolerance of expression that is hidden from the
161 See, e.g., HART, supra note 118, at 4-6 (defending and qualifying Mill's
philosophy in the context of sexual morality); Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitu-
tion: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 391, 391 (1963) (noting that traditional
libertarian thought shuns state regulation of sexual expression in the private sphere);
William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 382 (1954) (concluding that potential harms
resulting from sexual expression in literature are insufficiently tangible to warrant
state interference with such expression). See generally CLOR, supra note 74, at 88-135
(discussing "libertarian" objections to regulation of obscenity); Ronald Dworkin,
Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 480-84, 495-97 (1989) (assessing the validity
of Mill's harm principle with respect to nonphysical injury).
162 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
,63 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-51 (1989)
(discussing the value of self-determination and autonomy); Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (arguing that the First
Amendment serves the value of "individual self-realization"); Thomas Scanlon, A
Theoy of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 215-17 (1972) (theorizing that
free expression may serve to protect individual autonomy).
6 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 27 (1948) ("To be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for self-
government"); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theoy, 1977 AM.
B. FOUND. RES.J. 521, 533; see also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-34
(1980) (stating that freedom of speech is essential to keep open the channels of
political change); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse:
Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REV. 601, 672 (1990) (arguing that free public discourse is essential to
democratic government, and that "any effort substantively to circumscribe public
discourse is necessarily self-defeating, for it displaces the very democratic processes
it seeks to facilitate").
165 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PLAYING BY PORNOGRAPHY'S RULES
public eye serves the First Amendment's pedagogical goals much
less directly than tolerance of speech with which we are confronted
in public. Because freedom of speech in the public domain is so
essential to the First Amendment's core values, the Amendment's
guarantees are generally stronger with respect to public than private
matters.1 66  Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the importance of protecting political speech in the
public sphere.1
67
Public sexual expression, however, receives none of this
protection: indeed, the more sexual expression seeks to enter the
public arena, the more the Court sanctions its suppression. Social
regulation of sexual expression is driven by a moral judgment that
certain sexual expression should remain a private matter. Yet the
First Amendment generally precludes the regulation of expression
on any moral grounds and holds especially suspect the particular
moral judgment enforced here: namely, that speech should be
selectively suppressed precisely because it has been expressed in
public. The moral judgment that drives the sexual speech doctrine
is thus doubly antithetical to the First Amendment tradition. If the
sexual expression cases can be explained, they must find their
justification not in traditional First Amendment principles, but in
the specific values furthered by enforcing a public/private line in
matters of sexuality. When one examines the effects of enforcing
that line, however, it is far from clear that the line serves the
purposes that proponents of regulation claim for it.
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 155-57 (1986).
'" See e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-49 (1983) (holding that when a
public employee speaks on matters of personal interest and not public concern, the
court will not apply heightened scrutiny).
167 See e.g., id. at 145 ("[S]peech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the
heirarchy [sic] of First Amendment values' .... " (quoting NAACP v. Clairborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,913 (1982))); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971)
("[Freedom of expression] is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion ... in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and [a] more perfect polity
... upon which our political system rests."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964) ("[The] debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open.. . ."); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940) ("The freedom of
speech and of the press ... embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern .... ").
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III. SEX AND CIVILIZATION
What drives our society (and the Supreme Court) to insist upon
maintaining a public/private line with respect to sexual expression,
and what purpose does such regulation serve? Several explanations
have been offered, none completely satisfactory. I will review
several of these explanations and ultimately suggest that the
regulation of sexual expression has the paradoxical effect of
enforcing (and reinforcing) a pornographic conception of sexuali-
ty.
168
A. Avoiding Offense to Others
One of the most common justifications for the public/private
line maintains that the line is necessary to protect children and
unconsenting adults from exposure to offensive and degrading
materials.'69 Much like a public nuisance, sexual expression in
public, whether it be nudity, sexual conduct, or depictions thereof,
intrudes on the rights of those who seek to live in a community free
of that type of expression. Whether or not we ultimately agree with
their tactics, many would look upon community groups organizing
against the opening of an X-rated bookstore in their neighborhood
differently than we would look upon an effort to exclude an African-
American or Communist bookstore.' ° By allowing communities
'" Although I draw upon broader sources for this analysis, my observations do not
purport to make universal claims for all cultures, but are limited to observations
about the United States's contemporary cultural attitudes toward sexual expression.
169 Many of those who argue for the protection ofprivate sexual freedom acknowl-
edge society's interest in regulating public sex. See, e.g., HART, supra note 118, at 43-
47 (arguing against the regulation of private sexual practices based on their
"immorality," but conceding that public sexual practices could be regulated because
of the offense they inflict on others); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560, 590-91 (1991) (White,J, dissenting) (conceding legitimate government interest
in protecting unwilling viewers from offense of public nudity); HERBERT L. PACKER,
THE LIMrrS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 324 (1968) ("The only valid purpose of
obscenity laws is to prevent public offense. It should be viewed, purely and simply,
as the proscription of nuisance."); Henkin, supra note 161, at 401 ("It may be that the
Constitution regards state concern with private morality privately indulged differently
from state protection of the sensibilities of others against offensive public display
.... "); Schwartz, supra note 158, at 674-75 (noting that the Model Penal Code
penalizes "open lewdness" as a kind of public nuisance).
170 For example, the New York Times, which generally adopts avery pro-free-speech
stance, recently editorialized in favor of restrictive zoning of adult video and
pornography stores in New York. See Zoning, Sex, and Videotape, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1994, at A22. It is inconceivable that the Times would support restrictive zoning of
offensive political bookstores.
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to zone adult businesses out of their neighborhoods, but barring
outright suppression of X-rated literature, the Court allows the
community to maintain a "clean environment" at the same time as
it permits individuals access to sexual expression that can be
enjoyed in the privacy of their homes, or at least away from the
most public areas.
But this conventional rationale for the public/private distinction
is open to question. Why, for example, is a bookstore selling
sexually explicit books more objectionable than one selling violent,
misogynistic, or politically radical books? The perception that a
sexually explicit bookstore is more damaging to the quality of life
and that unwanted exposure to sexual expression is categorically
different from unwanted exposure to any other kind of expression
that the listener deems offensive may ultimately rest on nothing
more than social discomfort with and prejudice against sexual
expression. If so, this rationale only adds another layer of circulari-
ty to the argument in favor of repression of public sexual expres-
sion.
I do not mean to suggest that there is no social interest in
avoiding offense from public displays of sexuality. Quite plainly,
our society has extremely strong norms-both formal and infor-
mal-against precisely such displays. But we also have strong norms
against all manner of uncivil and dissident behavior, yet the First
Amendment generally protects such behavior from legal regula-
tion.'" Thus, it is not enough to say that public sexuality should be
treated like a public nuisance; 17 2 rather, one must explain why
representations of sex in particular should be treated in that
manner, but other offensive or degrading public displays-such as
swastikas, flag burning, profanity, hate speech, and the like-are not.
Moreover, even if one were to accept the legitimacy of the
interest in avoiding offense to unwilling viewers, that rationale does
not account for the permissible scope of legal regulation. Obscenity
doctrine applies even where there is no risk of offending children
'7 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (invalidating a
municipal ordinance prohibiting hate speech as impermissibly content-based); Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (shielding the publisher of an offensive
parody of a public figure); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing a
conviction under a state breach of peace statute for wearing a jacket bearing the
message, "Fuck the Draft"); Post, supra note 164, at 606 (describing the Falwell
decision as "an important articulation of the first amendment right to give offense").
17 See supra note 169.
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or unconsenting adults. 7 The public nudity law upheld in Barnes
applied to adults-only nude dancing bars where there was no danger
of offending children or unwilling viewers.' 74 The Court has
expressly rejected arguments that sexual expression may be
regulated only for the purpose of avoiding offense to others and has
found a legitimate interest in prohibiting immoral sexual expression
even where no listener is offended.'7 5 Thus, the interest in
avoiding offense to others fails to justify the disfavored treatment
of public sexual expression on two counts. It does not meaningfully
distinguish treatment of offensive sexual speech from treatment of
other kinds of offensive speech. Nor can it explain the scope of
sexual speech regulation condoned by the Court.
B. Mediating the Universal and the Particular
From a broader perspective, Michael Seidman has argued that
the public/private distinction serves to mediate basic but conflicting
human desires and needs in a liberal community. 7 He identifies
an inherent contradiction between the universalist ethic that we
should "treat all members of an expansively bounded community
with equal concern and respect," and our particularistic need to love
and care for certain people-such as family and friends-above all
others. 77 Society demands equal respect for all, and its rules and
regulations must satisfy that demand in order to be legitimate. As
citizens, then, we are directed to treat all equally. At the same time,
however, we find particular fulfillment in relationships that rise
above equal respect for our fellow citizens-relationships character-
ized by love, passion, and loyalty. These feelings cannot be
generalized: we cannot love everyone like we love our spouses,
children, siblings, parents, and friends. Love means holding a
specific individual or individuals above all others. Thus, the
universalist demand of equal respect inherently contradicts the
particularist demands of romantic and familial love.
'" See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1973).
'14 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991).
175 See id. at 575 (ScaliaJ., concurring); Paris Adult Theatre , 413 U.S. at 57-60, 65.
But cf. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684,688-
89 (1959) (forbidding a state from censoring a film as obscene simply because the
film expresses immoral ideas about adultery).
176 See Seidman, supra note 156, at 1007. See generally PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN
SOCIAL LIFE (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983) [hereinafter PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE].
177 Seidman, supra note 156, at 1019-23.
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In Seidman's view, the public/private distinction mediates this
contradiction by providing separate spheres in which we can "play
out our separate and contradictory public and private lives."
178
The private sphere allows for the pursuit of individualist or
particularistic ends, whereas universalist or communitarian goals
govern the public sphere.
Sexual expression is undoubtedly an important mechanism for
furthering the intimate, particularistic values associated with love.
If sexual expression necessarily implicates such particularist values,
its exclusion from the public sphere may be required in order to
avoid disruption of the universalist ethic that governs there. But it
is difficult to maintain that sexual expression is necessarily particular-
istic, given the widespread use of sexual appeals in public culture.
Sex symbols, for example, are quintessentially public and universal
figures. Their appeal has everything to do with the public images
of sexuality advanced by the fashion and entertainment industries
and little if anything to do with the particularistic values associated
with the private sphere.
Moreover, society does not demand that all representations of
particularistic love be restricted to the private sphere. Romantic
love is the stuff of bestselling books, movies, plays, and compact
discs. Public airing of our innermost psychological and emotional
selves is a staple of biography, memoirs, literature, and daytime talk
shows. If these particularistic ideals can be publicly aired without
undermining their character, why is the public representation of sex
different?
Indeed, there can be no clean boundary between public and
private sexual expression. As Seidman points out, the boundaries
of the private sphere are necessarily drawn in the public realm,
thereby making the identification of any private boundary line itself
a public matter.179  This is especially true of sexuality, which,
although often treated as "private" and "natural," is to a significant
extent socially constructed: what and who we see as "sexy," what we
expect from sex, and ultimately how we define our "sexuality" has
as much to do with public culture as with some presocial private
desire. As Michel Foucault has argued:
17
' Id. at 1019. Others have similarly described the public/private distinction as
a way of mediating the contradictions between individualist and communitarian
values. See Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus, The Liberal Conception of the Public and
the Private, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, supra note 176, at 31, 31.
179 See Seidman, supra note 156, at 1020-23.
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Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which
power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which
knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be
given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult
to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of
bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to dis-
course, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of
controls and resistances, are linked to one another .... 180
To the extent that sexuality is socially constructed, it is always
already public.
Moreover, Seidman's conception of different spheres serving
different functions does not explain a unique attribute of the
identification of sex as private. To say that a matter is private
ordinarily implies only that it is presumptively immune from social
regulation; it does not generally follow that society may mandate
that the matter remain private. We are generally permitted to reveal
our private affairs in public if we so choose. Yet, in the context of
sexual expression, one often finds the rhetoric of privacy used not
to justify freedom from regulation, but to rationalize the forcible
exclusion of sexual expression from the public sphere. Father
Ritter, for example, writing in the Report of the Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography, condemns pornography for its "total
and inadmissible invasion of a personal privacy so sacred and so
inalienable that it must always remain inviolate."""' In a remark-
able non sequitur, Ritter reasons that because sexual privacy is an
"inalienable" right, public sexual expression must be regulated.
Seidman's notion of separate spheres may explain why a society
would seek to protect private sexual expression from government
180 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SExUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 105-06
(Robert Hurley trans., 1990); see also id. at 155-57 (arguing that sex has become of
paramount importance in our society, to the point of creating "the desire to have it,
to have access to it, to discover it, to liberate it, to articulate it in discourse [and] to
formulate it in truth"); WEEKS, supra note 153, at 96-121 (discussing the construction
of homosexuality); William N. Eskridge,Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's
Sex and Reason: Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333, 365-66 (1992)
(discussing social construction of sexuality); Eskridge, supra note 98, at 1421-22
(explaining the social construction of same-sex marriage and relationships); Milton C.
Regan,Jr., Reason, Tradition and Family Law: A Comment on Social Constructionism, 79
VA. L. REv. 1515, 1521-22 (1993) (discussing socially constructed views of sexual
orientation and same-sex marriages). Although there is some evidence that
homosexuality and heterosexuality are in part genetically determined, see Chandler
Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1993, at 47, 64-65, that
evidence does not suggest that sexuality is exclusively genetically determined.
181 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 55, at 97 (statement of Father Bruce Ritter).
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regulation, but what explains the social mandate to keep sexual
expression private?
C. Freud and Foucault: The Repression Hypothesis and Beyond
One of the now-conventional accounts for why we exclude sex
from the public sphere is attributable to Sigmund Freud, who
maintained that repression of the libido is essential to civiliza-
tion."8 2 In Freudian theory, everyone's first love object is his or
her opposite-sex parent, and both development of the personality
and maintenance of the family require repression of these incestu-
ous desires."' From a societal standpoint, Freud thought the
repression of sexual drives necessary to redirect human energy into
more socially productive endeavors. Absent repression, the theory
goes, we would be even more obsessed with sex than we already are,
and no one would bother making the trains run on time.184 Freud
also considered sexual repression essential to social bonding.'
182 See SIGMUND FREUD, CIVLIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 64-74 (James Strachey
ed. & trans., 1961). The view that sexual repression is necessary to maintain
civilization is by no means unique to Freud. As Thomas Grey reports:
[E]very thinker of the great central tradition of the last century's social
thought has seen repressed sexuality and the authoritarian family structure
as close to the core of our civilization. Conservative theorists have defended
repression as necessary; revolutionaries have urged that society would have
to be overthrown to free us from its tyranny.
Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1980, at 83, 92; see also id. at 92-95 (tracing the linkage of sexual repression
and civilization through two strains of thought: one from tmile Durkheim to Max
Weber to Joseph Schumpeter and the other from Friedrich Engels to Herbert
Marcuse to Wilhelm Reich).
183 See FREUD, supra note 182, at 59-60.
184 See id. Harry Clor, arguing in favor of regulating obscenity, expressly relies on
Freud:
Every community must devote its attention to the discipline and direction
of powerful natural impulses. Every social order must endeavor to give the
sensual side of life its due while preventing undue or excessive preoccupa-
tion with it. The minds and energies of citizens must be available for the
long-range pursuits and higher ends of the community. This requires
socially imposed restraints upon the indulgence of the passions and, also,
socially imposed standards and values concerning the indulgence of the
passions.
CLOR, supra note 74, at 197.
18 See FREUD, supra note 182, at 65; see also 18 SIGMUND FREUD, Some Neurotic
Manifestations in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality, in THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 221,232 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1955) (arguing
that repression and sublimation of homosexual desire in men, attached initially to the
father, is necessary to the male bonding upon which civilization is built).
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In Seidman's terms, the particularism associated with a sexual
relationship (which encourages favoritism, sparks jealousy, and may
lead to aggression toward others) threatens the universalist values
necessary to membership in a larger community. In the military
parlance, "unit cohesion" requires desexualized ies. 8
The contours of the sexual speech doctrine can be seen in
Freudian terms. Freud posited that repression of sexuality does not
eradicate sexual thoughts, but merely submerges them into the
unconscious, where they continue to affect behavior and return in
the form of symptoms.' The Court similarly permits repression
but not suppression of most sexual speech. The state may limit
offensive but nonobscene sexual expression to particular parts of
town or particular times of day, as if to banish it to society's
"unconscious," but may not suppress it altogether. 88
Even in the obscenity realm, where the doctrine on its face
appears to authorize outright suppression of speech, in fact only
partial repression is achieved. Because of the application of local
community standards, hard-core obscenity is not forbidden
altogether but rather limited to distribution from the nation's red-
light districts: among others, New York City's Times Square,
Boston's Combat Zone, and San Francisco's Tenderloin. In New
York City, for example, the Second Circuit has held that nothing
"8 See, e.g., Bernard E. Trainor & Eric L. Chase, Don't Compromise the Ultimate
Mission, N.J. L.J., May 17, 1993, at 17, 32 (arguing that the military's ban on
homosexuals is justified to forestall sexual tension that would undermine "unit
cohesion").
For similar reasons, even before the modern-day concern with sexual harassment,
businesses often prohibited or discouraged sexual relationships between employees.
Even where such relationships are not expressly prohibited, fellow employees will
often seek to keep their relationships a secret at work. The apocryphal story of the
woman who slept her way to the top reflects not only male anxiety about women in
the workplace, but also the threat that sex is thought to pose to what some consider
the universalist meritocracy of the public world.
187 See SIGMUND FREUD, DORA: AN ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF HYSTERIA 146 (Philip
Rieff ed., 1963).
18 See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (invalidating
a total ban on dial-a-porn services but indicating that more limited restrictions may
be permissible); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986)
(permitting the zoning of adult theaters but suggesting that a total ban would be
invalid); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (permitting FCC
restrictions barring sexually indecent broadcasting only during certain hours of the
day); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504,1508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(rejecting a complete ban on broadcasting indecent speech and holding that some
safe harbor for indecent material is constitutionally required), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1281 (1992).
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could be patently offensive by community standards; thus, no
obscenity can be prohibited there."8 9 Furthermore, throughout
the nation, obscenity in the home is immune from suppression.
190
Thus, the Court's sexual speech doctrine functions less to permit
the suppression of sexual expression than to permit its repression
from the visible "public" sphere, just as, in Freud's view, the psyche
banishes unwelcome sexual thoughts to the unconscious, but cannot
extinguish them altogether.
More recently, Michel Foucault challenged Freud's theory of
sexual repression, arguing that the "repressive hypothesis" misun-
derstands the mechanisms by which sex is regulated.191 In Fou-
cault's view, modern society, far from repressing sexuality, has
"compell[ed] sex to speak."'92 From the confessional to the
analyst's couch to the Oprah Winfrey show, Western society is
preoccupied with talking about sex. Foucault maintains, however,
that this apparent lifting of repression has not in fact been liberat-
ing; rather, open discussion, categorization, and classification of sex
effect social control more efficiently and intricately than does blunt
repression. 9 ' "[W]hat is involved is the production of sexuality
rather than the repression of sex."194 In this view, social power
over individual citizens is exercised through the proliferation of
discourses about sex and through a culture that treats sexuality and
its investigation as the central truth about personal identity.9 5
The law's obsession with the public/private distinction appears
to make less sense from Foucault's perspective than from Freud's.
If social control is achieved more directly through public discourse
'89 See United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132,
137 (2d Cir. 1983).
19 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibits criminalizing mere private possession of obscene materials).
,91 See FOUCAULT, supra note 180, at 10, 1749.
19 Id. at 158.
193 See id. at 23-25.
194 Id. at 114.
195 See id. at 69-70. Foucault explains:
[I]t is this desirability of sex that attaches each one of us to the injunction
to know it, to reveal its law and its power; it is this desirability that makes
us think we are affirming the rights of our sex against all power, when in
fact we are fastened to the deployment of sexuality that has lifted up from
deep within us a sort of mirage in which we think we see ourselves
reflected-the dark shimmer of sex.
Id. at 156-57. For Foucault, then, Western society's preoccupation with sex provides
the mechanism for "power" (the source of which is generally unidentified in Fou-
cault's work) to more closely control us.
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about sex than through the relegation of sex to the private sphere,
one might expect to see less insistence on the public/private line.
Indeed, it was precisely for that reason that Thomas Grey predicted
in 1980 that "within a few years fornication and sodomy laws will be
found unconstitutional."1 9 He reasoned that given the increasing-
ly public presence of the homosexual community and the sheer
numbers of citizens living together (and engaging in sexual
relations) outside of marriage, the law would "legitimate" those
relationships in order to bring them above ground, where they
would be more subject to social control.
But Grey's prediction has not yet been realized. Six years after
his article was published, the Supreme Court upheld a sodomy
statute in Bowers v. Hardwick.9 ' Sodomy statutes remain on the
books in many states, and no state will legitimate gay or lesbian
relationships through marriage.'9 8 There has undoubtedly been,
however, some evolution in the direction Grey foresaw. The gay
and lesbian rights movement has made great strides in changing
popular (and judicial) opinion in recent years, so much so that legal
challenges to discriminatory policies against gays and lesbians in the
military-a defendant to which the courts are usually exceedingly
deferential-have succeeded in the lower courts. 9 ' And it seems
196 Grey, supra note 182, at 97. Grey argued that the Court's "privacy" decisions
were predicated not on an individualist notion of the right of consenting adults to
control their own sex lives, but on society's need to enforce "order and social
stability." Id. Thus, he saw Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which guaranteed the rights to contraceptives and
abortion, as protecting "the stability-centered concerns of moderate conservative
family and population policy." Grey, supra, at 90.
197 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
" See Eskridge, supra note 98, at 1421.
9 See e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that Navy
regulations compelling a midshipman to resign from the Naval academy solely
because he was an admitted homosexual violate equal protection), vacated and rehjg
en banc granted, No. 91-5409, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9977 (Jan. 7, 1994); Meinhold v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding
that a policy of banning homosexuals from military service based merely on sexual
orientation violates equal protection), aff'd in part and rev'd and vacated in part, Nos.
93-55242, 93-56354, 1994 WL 467311, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 1994) (holding that
servicemen may be discharged because of homosexual acts, but not merely because
of homosexuality); Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319,
1335, 1337 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (same); Elzie v. Aspin, 841 F. Supp. 439, 443-44 (D.D.C.
1993) (same); Selland v. Aspin, 832 F. Supp. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 1993) (same).
A 1993 Gallup Poll shows that 80% of the public supports equaljob opportunity
for gays, as compared to only 59% in 1982. See U.S. Poll Shows Division on Issue of
Homosexuals, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 30, 1993, at Cl. In general, public
opinion polls show that "there has been a steady erosion over the past 20 years of
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likely that Bowers will eventually be reversed; it is one of the
Supreme Court's most widely criticized decisions.
200
But the picture is far more complex than Grey painted it. The
growing gay-rights movement has been met in turn by growing
opposition from right-wing groups.20 1 Sodomy statutes remain on
the books in eighteen states202 and anti-gay ordinances have
become the next wave of legislation.2 3 While the sodomy laws are
rarely enforced except as backstops for prosecutions of rape or
prostitution,20 4 their existence arguably encourages less formal
forms of "enforcement," including private and public discrimination
against gays and lesbians, and gay-bashing.
205
public support for laws and practices that discriminate against homosexuals." Richard
Harwood, 'Strangers' In Our Midst, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1993, at A23.
200 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION, A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 81-83 (1991) (criticizing the Bowers decision as "either an
imposition of very great cruelty or an exercise in hypocrisy inviting arbitrary and
abusive applications of the criminal law"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw 1422-35 (2d ed. 1988) (criticizing the Bowers decision as failing to
acknowledge the underlying value of the right of privacy as protecting intimate
human associations); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62
IND. L.J. 215, 235-36 (1986) (describing the Bowers decision as "deviant" and
"perverse"); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1770 (1993) (characterizing the Bowers
decision as "the (judicial] exercise of homophobic power"); Lance Liebman,A Tribute
to Justice Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. 13, 19 (1993) (pointing to Bowers as
Justice White's least convincing and worst opinion); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of
Reason: A Rhetorical Reading ofBowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805,1806 (1993)
(arguing that Bowers reflects a "homophobic ideology").
Indeed,Justice Powell, one of the fiveJustices in the Bowers majority, essentially
changed his vote after stepping down from the Court. In remarks made at New York
University, Powell said, "I think I probably made a mistake" in voting with the
majority in Bowers. He stated that upon rereading the decision a few months after it
was issued, "I thought the dissent had the better of the arguments." Linda Green-
house, When Second Thoughts in Case Come Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1990, at A14.
For an argument that the First Amendment provides a doctrinal route to
reversing Bowers, see Cole & Eskridge, supra note 103.
"'1 See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 13.
203 See supra note 48.204 See, e.g., Ruben Castaneda, District Reexamines Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Feb.
26, 1992, at BI (reporting that District of Columbia City Administrator Robert L.
Mallet characterized the District's sodomy statute as one generally used only in
nonconsensual situations and as "not a primary law enforcement concern"); Deb
Price, There Ought Not to be a Law, Gannett News Service, July 9, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (asserting that actual sodomy prosecutions are rare).
"5 See Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431,1464
(1992) (noting that violence against gay men and lesbians is a "structural feature of
life in American society"); Thomas, supra note 200, at 1832 (asserting that the Bowers
decision rigidified sexual roles, setting homosexuals far apart from heterosexuals and
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This more complicated picture, and in particular the disjuncture
between formal regulation and informal practice, offers a potential
bridge between Freud and Foucault. As a formal matter, the law
follows a Freudian pattern, and insists upon a sharp public/private
line on matters of sexuality; in terms of actual enforcement,
however, the lines are anything but sharp, and may reflect a more
Foucauldian strategy of dispersed regulation. In practice, we allow
a great deal of sexual expression to surface in public, but at the
same time we insist on regulating its public manifestations, whether
through the zoning of red-light districts or the closely watched
regulation of otherwise nude dancers' apparel.
D. Art and Obscenity: An Issue of Control
While Freud and Foucault disagree about the mechanisms by
which power operates with respect to sexuality, both identify
sexuality as a central target of social control. Art critic Lynda Nead
provides some insight into why we target sexuality in her study of
"the female nude." She sees the female nude as "the border ...
between art and obscenity."2 0 Both art and obscenity take as a
primary subject the naked female body, which in a patriarchal
culture represents all that is threatening about the "other": excess,
passion, the unknown. But while art and obscenity share this
common subject, our culture insists on drawing the sharpest of
distinctions between them. Under both American and British law,
artistic expression and obscenity are mutually exclusive catego-
ries.
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Nead proposes that the distinction between art and obscenity
derives from the perceived danger of losing control that the "other"
presents. Art offers the illusion of mastery over its subject.
Through the formal elements of artistic representation, the artist
transforms the naked body into a "nude," represented, framed, and
contained. Thus, Kenneth Clark, who wrote the classic study of "the
nude," wrote that "[t]he nude remains the most complete example
of the transmutation of matter into form."2°8 The artist, Clark
making them susceptible to vilification); Deb Price,A GayRights Crusader Finds Success
At Last, STARTRiB., Oct. 13, 1993, at E4 (stating that sodomy laws are "indirectly used
to tar gay people and deny themjobs"); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
206 NEAD, supra note 91, at 25.
o See id. at 90 (noting that "artistic merit" is a defense to prosecution under
Great Britain's Obscene Publications Act of 1959); see also Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15,24 (1973) (defining obscenity as expression lacking any serious artistic merit).
m KENNETH CLARK, THE NUDE: A STUDY IN IDEAL FoRM 27 (1956). Not
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argued, "clothes" the naked body in artistic form, guided by the
formal rules of artistic representation."°9 As Nead points out:
"[I]f art is defined as the conversion of matter into form, imagine
how much greater the triumph for art if it is the female body that is
thus transformed-pure nature transmuted, through the forms of
art, into pure culture."
210
By contrast, Nead argues, obscenity represents that which
cannot be controlled. The term "obscene," she points out, "may be
a modification of the Latin 'scena,' so meaning literally what is off,
or to one side of the stage, beyond presentation." 21' Where
artistic representation reflects the triumph of form over matter,
obscenity is that which cannot be represented on stage, that which
is beyond form.
If... art is seen to represent the sublimation or transformation
of sexual drives, then pornography conveys the sexual unmediated;
it incites and moves the viewer to action. The pure aesthetic
experience is posed as a consolidation of individual subjectivity; it
can be seen in terms of the framing of the subject. In contrast,
the experience of pornography is described as a kind of distur-
bance; it presents the possibility of an undoing of identity.2 12
Nead compares the line between art and obscenity to Immanuel
Kant's distinction between the beautiful and the sublime. Kant
wrote that "[t]he Beautiful in nature is connected with the form of
the object, which consists in having boundaries." 23 The sublime,
by contrast, "is to be found in a formless object, so far as in it or by
occasion of it boundlessness is represented, and yet its totality is also
present to thought."214  Like the sublime, Nead suggests, the
obscene represents the threat of limitlessness, of the absence of
boundaries.
21 5
From this perspective, the law's attempt to regulate the public
representation of sexuality may be understood as an attempt to limit
the limitless, to assert the power to control that which risks being
beyond control. Like the pasties and G-strings mandated by
coincidentally, Clark is best known for his BBC television series, Civilisation, which
was shown throughout the United States on PBS. See NEAD, supra note 91, at 12.2
1 See generally CLARK, supra note 208, at 1-29.
210 NEAD, supra note 91, at 18.
211 Id. at 25.
212 id. at 28.
21" KANT, supra note 60, at 101-02.
214 Id. at 102.
215 See NEAD, supra note 91, at 29-30.
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Indiana's nude dancing law, the regulation of sexual expression
insists on imposing a limit, any limit, no matter how tenuous or
fleeting that limit may be, for the sake ultimately of the limit itself.
Uncontrolled sexual expression presents the same threat that the
naked female body presents; the legal regime, like the regime of
artistic form, provides a way (for men) to assert mastery over this
foreign subject.
But while Nead's dichotomy captures much of what makes
obscenity dangerous, her view of the pornographic as "the sexual
unmediated"2 16 fails to recognize the extent to which pornography
(and at least in this culture, sexuality) is itself already dependent
upon limits. While the obscene challenges and defies the limits that
law imposes, at the same time it could not exist without those limits.
Far from being "unmediated," pornography is a highly formalized
genre, subject to and dependent upon an elaborate set of rules.
E. Taboo and Transgression: The Erotic Limits of Law
While Freud, Foucault, and Nead explain the regulation of
sexuality as protecting civilization from the disruptions and dangers
attendant to sex, it may also be understood as protecting sex from
civilization. By maintaining an aura of mystery and imposing a set
of taboos, the regulation of sexual expression contributes (in most
instances unconsciously) to what makes sex sexy. As Elizabeth
Cowie has suggested: "[S]exuality is never a mere biological fact;
rather, it is also a social concept .... It is constructed by the social
discourses of a community or society. Central to this construction
is the opposition permitted/forbidden or proper/improper."217
Foucault saw this dynamic in all regulation of sexuality, be it
legal, professional, medical, or social:
The medical examination, the psychiatric investigation, the
pedagogical report, and family controls may have the over-all and
apparent objective of saying no to all wayward or unproductive
sexualities, but the fact is that they function as mechanisms with
a double impetus: pleasure and power. The pleasure that comes
of exercising a power that questions, monitors, watches, spies,
searches out, palpates, brings to light; and on the other hand, the
pleasure that kindles at having to evade this power, flee from it,
fool it, or travesty it. The power that lets itself be invaded by the
216 See supra text accompanying note 212.
217 Elizabeth Cowie, Pornography and Fantasy: Psychoanalytic Perspectives, in SEX
EXPOSED, supra note 14, at 132, 133.
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pleasure it is pursuing; and opposite it, power asserting itself in
the pleasure of showing off, scandalizing, or resisting.... These
attractions, these evasions, these circular incitements have traced
around bodies and sexes, not boundaries not to be crossed, but
perpetual spirals of power and pleasure.218
In this account, sexuality is neither separate from nor prior to social
control, but is a function of the very social control asserted over it.
Like an adult game of "hide-and-seek," the regulation of sexuality
creates much of the attraction and excitement that surrounds
sexuality, and indeed constructs what we understand as "sexuality."
Much of pornography's appeal lies in approaching and
transgressing the social taboos that we develop to regulate it.
Simone de Beauvoir, describing the infamous pornographer Marquis
de Sade's philosophy, stated "[n]o aphrodisiac is so potent as the
defiance of Good." 219 As Ellen Willis has argued, "However loudly
people proclaim that porn is as wholesome as granola, the essence
of its appeal is that emotionally it remains taboo."220  Similarly,
Mary McIntosh has maintained that because "an essential ingredient
of pornography [is] the desire to shock, to cross the boundaries, to
explore forbidden zones," pornography "represents a contradiction
within bourgeois Christian morality, in that it exists only because it
is condemned. Pornography and censoriousness are an inseparable
couple."221 Thus, civilization and its rules are at least as necessary
218 FOUCAULT, supra note 180, at 45; see also Vance, supra note 71, at 45
(describing titillation of Meese Commission hearings).
219 SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, Must We Burn Sade?, in THE MARQUIS DE SADE: THE 120
DAYS OF SODOM AND OTHER WRITINGs 28 (1966).
" ELLEN WILLIS, Feminism, Moralism, and Pornography, in BEGINNING TO SEE THE
LIGHT: PIECES OF A DECADE 219 (1981). She notes further that "pornography is the
return of the repressed, of feelings and fantasies driven underground .... Pruri-
ence-the state of mind I associate with pornography-implies a sense of sex as
forbidden, secretive pleasure." Id. at 220-21.
2' Mary McIntosh, Liberalism and the Contradictions of Sexual Politics, in SEx
EXPOSED, supra note 14, at 155, 166. Lynne Segal makes a similar point:
What we do not find in pornography-hence its provocation-are the accept-
able male emotions associated with the approved discourses on male sexuali-
ty. Sex restrained by love and marriage, sex which is 'protective,' 'respect-
able' and 'faithful,' reverses into its opposite: sex greedy for immediate,
unlimited, self-centered gratification. But would we have the pornographic
representation without the accompanying authoritative discourses of and on men
and their sexuality? The mirroring themes of the acceptable and transgres-
sive discourses on sexuality suggest a dialectical relation between the two.
Segal, supra note 69, at 68 (emphasis added); see also SUSAN GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY
AND SILENCE: CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE 15 (1981) (stating that "the
pornographer is obsessed with the idea of transgression");Joel Kovel, The Antidialectic
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for keeping pornography exciting as pornography's repression is
necessary for keeping civilization civilized.
222
Pornography's dependence on taboo is so strong that even
where the law does not draw lines, pornographers themselves draw
them. Thus, soft-core pornography, of the sort that appears in
Playboy or Penthouse, obeys careful strictures that are not legally
imposed at all. Most pictorials depict women only, either alone or
in pairs. Where men enter the picture, their genitals are generally
obscured; if a penis is displayed, it is never erect. And actual
penetration is virtually never depicted.2 23
Hard-core pornography, by contrast, is full of erect penises and
penetration. 224  Even here, however, lines are carefully drawn.
One line, ever present at least in theory, is that hard-core pornogra-
phy may be deemed obscene, something not even theoretically
possible with soft-core pornography. 225  Moreover, hard-core
pornography also places limits on the representation of men as sex
objects: while sex between women and heterosexual sex are staples
of hard-core pornography, sex between men is generally restricted
to pornography distinctively identified as gay or bisexual.
At first, these strictures, largely self-imposed, seem paradoxical.
Pornography presents itself as liberating, yet religiously heeds its
own self-imposed limits. In part, these distinctions may be an
attempt to target different markets of desire. But they also suggest
of Pornography, in MEN CONFRONT PORNOGRAPHY 153, 159 (Michael S. Kimmel ed.,
1990) ("If there were no taboos to transgress, there would be no interest at all in
pornography.")
Studies suggest that the existence of restrictions on sexually explicit materials
may make them more desirable. See Maurice Yaffe, Pornography: An Updated Review
(1972-1977), in COMMITTEE ON FILM CENSORSHIP, supra note 73, at 235, 238; see also
Howard L. Fromkin & Timothy C. Brock, Erotic Materials: A Commodity Theory
Analysis of the Enhanced Desirability That May Accompany Their Unavailability, 3 J.
APPLIED SOc. PSYCHOL. 219,219 (1973) (reporting that "making erotic materials more
difficult to obtain... may increase interest in the materials"). This may explain the
pornographic film industry's penchant for labeling their films "X" and "XXX," playing
on the nonpornographic film industry's ratings system. Cf 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
supra note 55, at 279-80 (discussing the Motion Picture Association of America rating
system).
22 See ANNETTE KUHN, THE POWER OF THE IMAGE: ESSAYS ON REPRESENTATION
AND SEXUALITY 33 (1985) (noting that "[p]hotographs of erect penises, for example,
are usually confined to hardcore and to gay male pornography, while representations
of acts of heterosexual intercourse are also limited in availability").
24 See id. at 33-34, 44-46.
_ Soft-core pornography is likely to fail one or both of the obscenity require-
ments that the material be "patently offensive" and lack any significant artistic or
social value. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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that pornographers intuit that their product's attraction might be
lost if the lines were erased, and sex was actually "liberated." As
Annette Kuhn explains: "In order to maintain its attraction, porn
demands strictures, controls, censorship. Exposed to the light of
day, it risks a loss of power. Pornography invites policing."22
Pornography's self-imposed lines also serve another function:
they make it safe to indulge in sexual fantasies. By allowing
individuals to choose precisely what type of fetish or practice they
will view or read about, pornography gives the reader the freedom
to lose himself without fear that he will really lose himself.227 The
capacity to break free of one's inhibitions is part of what makes sex
both exciting and dangerous. Butjust as children play more freely
where there are some outside rules to guide them, adults may feel
more free to lose themselves if they are assured of a limit.
22
Thus, pornography's self-imposed limits paradoxically provide the
illusion of danger and a promise of safety: you won't be too
surprised.
The laws we impose on sexual expression play a similar
paradoxical role. Indiana's legally-mandated pasties and G-strings,
for example, may make nude dancing more appealing by represent-
ing a taboo to be challenged, and at the same time may give the
viewer a sense of security: the law assures him that there are limits
to the play in which he is engaging. Similarly, obscenity prohibi-
tions simultaneously reinforce the taboo character of sexual speech
and assure readers and viewers that the bulk of pornography is
socially acceptable. By constitutional definition, obscenity laws may
proscribe only those sexually explicit materials which are patently
226 KUHN, supra note 223, at 23.
2 Indeed, because it is generally consumed on a solitary basis, the reader or
viewer of pornography retains ultimate control. He or she may dose the book, stop
the video, or hang up the phone at any point. The only "other" in pornography is
the represented "other," far less threatening than a partner who might assert his or
her own independent will, and take one further than one dares to go.
22 According to Susan Keller, practitioners of ritual sadomasochism expressly rely
on such lines: once it is established that certain lines will not be crossed, or that the
masochistic partner has the power to call a halt at any point, the couple is free to play
with fears and desires about dominance and submission that theywould not otherwise
be willing to indulge. See Keller, supra note 58, at 2218-19. As Keller has noted, in
"ritual [sadomasochism], the erotic quality may be enhanced by the fact that the
violence is contained and controlled by the parties, allowing them to be aware of the
ritual as well as the immediate experience." Id. at 2219; see id. at 2217-22 (describing
various levels of sadomasochistic sex); see also STEVEN SEIDMAN, EMBATTLED EROS:
SEXUAL POLITICS AND ETHICS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 115-22 (1992) (discussing
lesbian sadomasochism).
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offensive, appeal to a "shameful or morbid interest in sex," and have
no literary, artistic, or social value.229 Because this prohibition is
so narrow, it serves in practice not so much to purge the community
of explicit sexually arousing speech as to validate everything that
remains as nonoffensive, "normal," or socially valuable. In this way,
obscenity doctrine collectively assures the community that the
pornography it consumes at such a high rate is acceptable.
If sexual speech regulation were limited to obscenity laws,
however, the very legitimacy of nonobscene sexual expression might
well deprive the bulk of pornography of its power. The regulation
of "offensive" sexual speech allows nonobscene sexual expression to
share in the attraction of the forbidden. It ensures that where
sexual expression is publicly communicated, it is kept in the dark
shadows of the public sphere-in the red-light districts of town, the
cordoned-off sections of video stores, and the adults-only bars and
movie theaters. The economic success of the pornography industry
attests to society's demand for its products, but consumption is, for
the most part, kept under the table.2 11 In addition to maintaining
pornography's desirability as forbidden fruit, the zoning of sexual
expression supports a strategy of plausible deniability for a society
that feels guilty about the pornography it consumes. By keeping
pornography off Main Street but not suppressing it altogether, we
can have our cake while denying that we are hungry.
23 1
At the same time, the lines drawn by pornography's social and
self-regulation serve an ideological function. Kuhn has suggested
that pornography's taboos underscore the centrality of its male
'z See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
"i Pornography has been estimated as a $7-8 billion per year industry. See
Maureen Dowd, Yes, But Can She Make Them Swoon?, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, at E3
(estimating annual revenues at $7 billion per year);Joseph L. Galloway &Jeannye
Thornton, Crackdown onPornograpky-A No-Win Battle, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP.,June
4, 1984, at 84, 84 (estimating annual revenues at $8 billion per year).
" Elizabeth Cowie has argued that all regulation of sexual desire shares this
paradoxical character:
It is a paradox that while sexual relations are pre-eminently the object of
social control in human societies sexual desire is often taken to be
something beyond social organization or rational control. The realm of the
sexual is seen as par excellence the realm of the irrational, the anarchic-the
realm of the senses. However, the opposition control/beyond control arises
only once "control" is imposed .... The "beyond control" is then desire,
including or especially sexual desire .... Desire here is most truly itself
when it is most "other" to social norms, when it transgresses the limits and
exceeds the "proper."
Cowie, supra note 217, at 134.
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heterosexual perspective:
[I]t appears hard to fathom why it is that both the sexual subjectiv-
ity which sets itself up as the cultural norm (masculinity) and the
sexual practice we are all meant to strive for (heterosexuality) are
both in certain respects unrepresentable. Photographs of erect
penises, for example, are usually confined to hardcore and to gay
male pornography, while representations of acts of heterosexual
intercourse are also limited in availability. Such censorships,
however, far from marginalising certain sexual practices, precisely
construct them as the really important ones." 2
If the pornographic representation of women constitutes a
mechanism for men to assert control over women through objectifi-
cation, we might well expect the rules to bar "equal" pornographic
treatment of men, which is indeed relegated to "hard-core" gay or
bisexual pornography. Lynne Segal has argued that the absence of
the penis in soft-core pornography may reflect a concern that the
metaphorical power of the phallus would be deflated by literal
images of penises.2 3  The pornographic presentation of women
provides the illusion that female sexuality-so threatening to
men-can be "captured" by the camera; the relative absence of the
penis correlatively implies that male sexuality remains beyond
control. Still another possible explanation stems from men's fear
of homoerotic desire; the consumer might find himself excited by
the display of erect penises, which in turn might lead him to
question his heterosexuality. Thus, pornography's lines not only
maintain the allure of sexual expression, but underscore its ideology
of heterosexual normativity and male dominance.
Conservatives view the threat posed by erasure of the lines of
sexual repression and regulation as the loss of moral values. But at
least as significant a threat may be the loss of sexual expression's
particular appeal. Duncan Kennedy has argued that what makes a
particular style of dress sexy is its deviation from the norm of the
setting in which it is worn." 4 An outfit that might not be particu-
larly sexy in the bedroom or on the beach may become sexy if worn
in a less sexually-charged setting, such as a school, office, or
2 KUHN, supra note 223, at 33-34.
23 See SECAL, supra note 52, at 87-88; see afso Jacques Lacan, The Meaning of the
Phallus, in FEMININE SExUALiTY 74, 82 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds. &
Jacqueline Rose trans., 1982) (proposing that the "phallus can only play its role as
veiled").
' See Kennedy, supra note 69, at 1344-48.
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supermarket. By alluding to the more sexually charged setting, sexy
dress invites the imagination of the viewer into that setting.
2 35
Sexy dress invites the public viewer to imagine a private encounter.
If everybody dressed sexy, Kennedy argues, the norm would
simply change, and the dress would no longer be sexy. Normaliza-
tion "deprives any particular sexy dress practice of its sexiness."
23 6
If dress that signifies "private" comes to signify "public," an
essential element of its erotic appeal will be lost. The pasties and
G-strings-and indeed public nudity laws generally-thus protect the
sexiness of nudity, by mandating that nudity not be normalized.
The lines we draw, it seems, are as important to sex as they are to
civilization.
As we have seen, the most fundamental line of all in the
regulation of sexual expression is the public/private distinction.
Pornography would be virtually inconceivable without such a line to
transgress: by representing sex for the consumption of others,
pornography makes the private public. Its defining tropes are
exhibitionism (from the standpoint of the pornographic model) and
voyeurism (from the standpoint of the consumer), both of which
make no sense unless there is a line between public and private to
transgress. Thus, it is the very regulation of pornography that
makes pornography possible.
The paradoxical effects of the regulation of sexual expression
suggest that those who urge pornography's regulation may be
engaging in a self-defeating enterprise. While it is at best specula-
tive that such regulation will in fact uphold morality or further
equality, the respective goals of fundamentalists and feminists, it is
virtually certain that such regulation will enhance pornography's
appeal. Like the pasties and G-string, whatever lines society draws
will themselves be fetishized, and will become the focal points of
"s See id. at 1372 (asserting that the "sexy dresser invites the straight male
audience to imagine being with her in the setting [to which] her dress alludes").
2s6 Id. at 1349; see also id. at 1361 ("[T]he pleasures of sex are connected with the
pleasures of ideological contest and of transgression. Changing the norm might de-
eroticize behavior that had the pleasures of defiance or deviance.").
This theory suggests that the nude dancers in Barnes would have lost if they had
won. They argued that the nude dancing law caused them economic injury in that
they received larger tips when they danced entirely naked than when they wore
pasties and a G-string. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563 (1991).
But that may well have been true only because the law prohibiting nude dancing,
which made entirely nude dancing more desirable. If Indiana's law had been struck
down, fully nude dancing would have become normalized, and the dancers would
have had to challenge some other legal line in order to receive higher tips.
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desire. The fact that pornographers create their own lines suggests
that the would-be regulators are playing into the pornographers'
hands.
At the same time, if regulation of sexual expression has as much
to do with keeping sex sexy as with keeping civilization civilized, one
might question why anyone should be concerned about regulation
at all. Like the separation of church and state, perhaps the public/
private line serves valuable ends for both sides of the equation.
This conclusion, however, is too simple. There are in fact many
victims of the rules that govern public sexual expression. There are
the few who are actually prosecuted; given the remarkable amount
and variety of sexual expression that goes without prosecution, to
be prosecuted for obscenity these days is akin to being struck by
lightning."' And there are the surely larger number who are
chilled by such rules: some may go through life unable to express
or discover their sexual identity because of society's taboos about
sexual expression; others will go ahead and violate the taboos but
suffer substantial guilt and self-recrimination in doing so.
But most troubling of all may be the sexuality that these
regulations produce. As Foucault stated, "what is involved is the
production of sexuality rather than the repression of sex."238 The
sexuality produced by social regulation of sexual expression is itself
pornographic; it is obsessed with taboo and transgression. Sexuality
need not be so limited. It can also be the most profound expression
of love, connection, and commitment that two human beings can
share. But because our society has been so obsessed with control-
ling and regulating sexual expression, we have elevated the aspects
of transgression and taboo above all others. Just as the attempt to
censor an artist may increase interest in the artist's work for the
wrong reasons, so the regulation of sexual expression increases
interest in precisely those aspects of sex that we seek to control, and
for the wrong reasons. The regulation of sexual expression thus
" The Meese Commission reported that "[als a purely empirical matter, ....
determinations of obscenity for even the most explicit and offensive of [sexually
explicit] magazines seem aberrational, and by and large most of these magazines
circulate widely throughout the country without significant legal attack." 1 ATroRNEY
GENERAL, supra note 55, at 281. The inherent arbitrariness of such enforcement
raises substantial concerns about fairness. Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(striking down the death penalty because its arbitrary application rendered it cruel
and unusual punishment).
2" FOUCAULT, supra note 180, at 114.
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imposes a cost not only on our constitutional doctrine, but on the
very meaning of sexuality.
23 9
The notion that we have created a pornographic sexuality
through the rules we have laid down is counterintuitive. Precisely
because our social norms condemn pornography, we are likely to
resist the suggestion that our cbnception of sexuality is itself
inextricably tied to pornography and its regulation. We regulate
pornography because we reject it as a "proper" form of sexual
expression. The message that Americans enjoy relatively stable,
monogamous, and routine sex lives-the interpretation that the news
media initially gleaned from a recent survey of sex in America-is
much easier to accept.
2 °
But one need only open one's eyes to see the extent to which a
pornographic conception of sex, obsessed with the erotics of
transgressing taboos, dominates our culture. Pornographic maga-
zines and videos do a thriving business. Even in more mainstream
culture, sexual taboos and their transgression sell everything from
movies to magazines to records to clothes to television shows to
perfume. We are obsessed with those who dare to approach, play
with, and transgress the rules: Calvin Klein advertisements,
Madonna videos, Prince songs, NYPD Blue, Cosmopolitan advice
columns on adding spice to your sexual life, and daytime talk shows
featuring those who have broken the rules and lived to tell their
story on national television.
- The rules we impose on the expression of sexuality-whether
legal, cultural, or religious-ultimately fuel these obsessions and
channel our conception of sexuality into the very transgressive
239 1 do not mean to suggest that a prior notion of sexuality-pure, unalienating,
and loving-has been corrupted by social regulation. Rather, I simply note that other
conceptions of sexuality are possible, and that the regulatory impulse produces a
particular and particularly pornographic conception.
240 See LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 68, at 375, 546-47; Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Now
for the Truth About Americans and Sex, TIME, Oct. 17, 1994, at 64 (reporting that the
survey suggests that "the sex lives of most Americans are about as exciting as a
peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwich");Joannie M. Schrof & Betsy Wagner, Sex in America,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1994, at 74, 76 (noting that the sex survey shows
that "Americans are doing less with each other sexually than the images gleaned from
popular culture would imply-and when they do have sex, it's pretty conventional").
Because the survey was based on face-to-face interviews, it is quite possible that the
results were skewed by the subjects' reluctance to be candid about intimate questions
posed by strangers, even under a guarantee of confidentiality. See LAUMANN ET AL.,
supra, at 55-60. Indeed, 21% of the surveyinterviews were conducted in the presence
of a spouse, children, or other person raising further questions about candor. See id.
at 568.
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ideology that, at least on the surface, we seek to suppress. 241 We
are caught, ultimately, in a cycle of prohibition and transgression.
This cycle simultaneously offers the illusion of control by enforcing
a set of lines, and the illusion of danger, as the forbidden is
eroticized. But the cycle is a limiting one, as our imagination is
imprisoned within the bounds of two contrary illusions, thereby
avoiding the truly dangerous but also truly liberating possibilities of
sexual communication with another.
The costs imposed by the paradoxical games we play in
regulating sexual expression are most sharply reflected in the red-
light district. The red-light district is a geographical marker of
compromise that we have reached in the regulation of public sexual
expression. Neither public nor private, it represents the margin of
our sexual experience, the place to which we relegate "private"
sexual expression in "public." The red-light district reveals both the
impossibility of maintaining a sharp public/private line and the
impoverished vision of sexuality we have constructed through our
regulation of it. Partially exposed, partially hidden, but very much
regulated (both legally and socially), the red-light district reflects all
of our culture's ambivalent feelings towards sexual expression. The
"red light" at once conjures the inviting colored light of a brothel's
back room and the simplest of social directives: "Stop!" But as we
have seen, the image of prohibition adds to the attraction. What is
illegal elsewhere is permitted here; in the red-light district, the lines
between public and private not only may be but are necessarily
blurred. Here, sex and its representations, the most private of
goods, are sold and exchanged on the public market, but always
"under wraps." Precisely because pornography fetishizes whatever
line the law imposes, a sharp public/private line cannot be
maintained. The red-light district is civilization's compromise with
sex.
But is this the kind of compromise we really want? The red-light
district, as the Court expressly recognized in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc. and Renton v. Playtime Theatre, Inc. is a dark and dismal
place, populated by unsavory characters and redolent with "second-
241 In some sense, of course, fascination with transgression is an inevitable by-
product of regulation of any sort and is not limited to regulation of sexual expression.
But taboos around expresbion have a particularly strong effect in this regard; censor-
ship of ideas seems to lead to stronger interest and curiosity in the suppressed than
does prohibition of illegal conduct. Moreover, taboos have a freight in the sexual
setting that they seem to bear nowhere else.
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ary effects." The image of sex reflected by this "boundary line" is
cheap and tawdry; it has everything to do with the excitement of the
forbidden and little to do with communication with another. Nor
could we "solve" the problem by banning red-light districts; the
boundary line would simply reappear somewhere else, with all of the
same effects. If this is the limiting case of our regulation of
sexuality, it suggests that the regulatory strategy is deeply misguid-
ed. The red-light district reveals what our attempts to assert
mastery and control over sexuality produces: pornography itself.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the regulation of sexual expression cannot be
justified under traditional speech doctrines and indeed inverts two
of the First Amendment's most fundamental principles: the maxim
that the First Amendment's central purpose is to protect public
dialogue from official censorship, and the "bedrock principle"
242
that society may not censor expression merely because it finds it
offensive, morally or otherwise. The regulation of sexual expression
excludes sexual expression from public debate precisely because a
majority claims to find its public expression morally offensive. That
the Supreme Court has endorsed such an inversion of First
Amendment values suggests that the Court considers the benefits
served by policing the public/private line to outweigh First
Amendment principle. Yet neither the Court nor commentators
have devoted much attention to the effects that enforcing that line
has on society or sexuality.
Although the public/private line is conventionally seen as
essential to maintain the values of civilization, it plays an equally
central role in the construction of sexuality. In large part, what
makes sexual expression sexy in our culture is the potential for
transgression, for abandonment of inhibitions, and for the play of
fantasy. Social prohibitions ironically contribute to this conception
of sexuality by constructing lines to transgress, inhibitions to
abandon, and a "normal" reality against which fantasies may be
played out. Pornographers play along with the lines society draws
and even go further by drawing their own lines. Society regulates
sexual expression because of its perceived dangers, yet without such
regulation sexual expression might well lose some of its "dangerous"
appeal.
242 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
PLAYING BY PORNOGRAPHY'S RULES
Thus, while conventional accounts of sexual regulation portray
the sex drive as an otherwise unrestrained libidinal instinct that
must be contained, sublimated, and regulated to serve the interests
of civilization, I have suggested that the sex drive is itself shaped by
the regulatory lines we draw and precisely by the excitement that
transgressing those taboos promises. The regulation of sexual
expression reveals at bottom, not a struggle between social order
and sexual anarchy, but a dynamic in which both law and sex are
inextricably dependent on the drawing of lines. Paradoxically, then,
sexual expression to some extent will always elude society's
desperate attempts to regulate it, because sexual expression
transforms whatever taboo is imposed into a fetish.
By our regulatory obsession we have constructed a very
particular type of sexuality, one in which transgressing lines and
violating taboos is central to sexual excitement. We should not (and
most of us do not) assume that such a construction of sexuality is
necessary or inevitable. But this construction of sexuality is so
strongly determined in our culture-by the very regulations we
impose-that it is difficult to conceive of sexuality in other than
transgressive terms. This construction of sexuality limits the
possibilities for alternative visions of sexuality, visions that are not
delimited by the transgression of taboos. Both the traditional critics
of pornography, who envision a sexuality characterized by love and
devotion, and the feminist critics, who seek a sexuality predicated
on equality between women and men, undermine their own causes
by focusing on suppression as the means for achieving those ideals.
They would do better not to seek to control sexual expression, but
instead to participate in affirmative private and public exploration
of alternative visions. In the end, not only the First Amendment,
but sexuality itself, demand more speech, not less. More regulation
and less speech will only ensure that we remain bound to a
pornographic conception of sexuality.
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FROM THE EDITORS
On April 1, 1994, the University of Pennsylvania Law School
presented the David L. Bazelon Conference in Science, Technology,
and Law. The Conference honored judge Bazelon and featured pre-
sentations by his former law clerks, Robert A. Burt, Alexander M.
Capron, E. Donald Elliott, Steven P. Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill,
Martha Minow, and Peter L. Strauss. University of Pennsylvania
faculty members Barry S. Cooperman, Michael A. Fitts, Frank I.
Goodman, Heidi Hurd, A. Leo Levin, Susan P. Sturm, and Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse provided commentary on the main presenta-
tions. The Law Review hopes that the following Conference excerpt
reflects the uniformly high-caliber and provocative scholarship
offered by the Bazelon Conference participants.
